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Index 129xC O N T E N T SChapter 1
Introduction
This thesis deals with individual decision making, mainly when risk or uncertainty
are relevant. This means that a decision maker (an agent, a group, a government)
h a st oc h o o s ea m o n ga c t i o n sh a v i n gr i s k yo ru n c e r t a i no u t c o m e sc o n c e i v a b l e .T h e
decision maker endorses a preference relation over the actions available to her.
The decision is under risk when the probabilities of the outcomes are known,
under uncertainty when the probabilities are unknown.
For example one can bet on a ﬂip of a coin, winning a monetary prize if heads
show up, and nothing if tails show up. Probabilities for head and tail showing up
are (known and) equal to 1/2. A bettor can gamble some money on the winner
of a race among participating horses. Only one horse will win. However, it is
uncertain which horse is going to win. Depending on the winner she can get a
monetary prize.
In economics these situations are standard: cases like insurance contracts, de-
mand for assets in ﬁnance, Bayesian games, gambling behavior, income distrib-
utions in social welfare, macroeconomic policies, choice of savings and pension
funds, are all strongly inﬂuenced by the presence of risk or uncertainty. Further-
more, a ﬁrm deciding to open a new plant in a third world country has to face
the uncertainty of the political situation. The uncertainty of elections in the US
inﬂuences the investments world-wide.
The aim of this work is thus the study of individual decision making from both a
normative and a descriptive point of view. Classical models are expected utility
(von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944) and subjective expected utility (Savage
12
1954).
The descriptive power of the above-mentioned models has been challenged by
failures in behavioral evidence, shown for example by Allais (1953) and Ellsberg
(1961). Since the end of the 70’s several alternatives to the classic paradigm have
been proposed in order to accommodate the deviations, see Schmidt (1998) and
Starmer (2000) for surveys.
In this thesis, particular emphasis is given to the study of models alternative to
the classical paradigm. Starmer (2000) reports that “an enormous amount of
theoretical eﬀort has been devoted towards developing alternatives to expected
utility (...).” Among the many alternatives present in the literature, the main
focus is on the rank-dependent models. The rank-dependent models were intro-
duced by Quiggin (1981) for decision under risk (known probabilities) and by
Schmeidler (1989) for decision under uncertainty (unknown probabilities). They
generalize and propose a natural extension of the standard paradigm by permit-
ting nonlinear weighting of probabilities. In these theories the decision weights
(transformation of probabilities through a weighting function) play an important
role in the explanation of phenomena not captured by classical expected utility.
Decision weights characterize sensitivity towards probabilities, a concept becom-
ing more and more popular in economic theory, see for example Camerer (1999).
Furthermore, rank-dependence has been incorporated in original prospect theory
(Kahneman & Tversky 1979), leading to cumulative prospect theory (Tversky &
Kahneman 1992).
The present thesis is based on 6 chapters. In the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h et h e s i st w o
plausible alternatives to expected utility and an experimental investigation on
rank-dependence are presented. In Chapter 2 the intuition underlying the rank-
dependent models is provided and explained. A model should satisfy three re-
quirements. It should be mathematically sound in order to avoid behavioral
anomalies such as implausible violations of stochastic dominance (Fishburn 1978).
This requirement can be guaranteed by one of the many preference axiomati-
zations. A model should accommodate behavioral observations: the empirical
performances of rank-dependent models have been studied and the study is still
going on. Furthermore a model should be intuitively plausible. Its concepts
should provide new insights and be economically meaningful. Only a few authors
have given intuitive principles for the building blocks of rank-dependent models:1. Introduction 3
rank-dependence and comonotonicity. It has been suggested recently that these
concepts are technical tools without intuitive or empirical content and that a
complete intuitive foundation of rank-dependence is still lacking. This study has
introduced such contents in order to interpret the models in a more intuitive man-
ner. As a result, rank-dependence and comonotonicity are more natural concepts
upon which preference conditions, empirical tests, and improvements for utility
measurement can be based. Further, a new derivation of the rank-dependent
models is obtained. It is not based on observable preference axioms or on empiri-
cal data, but naturally follows from the intuitive perspective assumed. We think
that the popularity of the rank-dependent theories is mainly due to the natural
concepts adopted in these theories.
Next, the second alternative model is presented. The spirit of Chapter 3 is to
present a model that generalizes expected utility by allowing a diﬀerent treat-
ment of riskless outcomes, while keeping the same features of expected utility
when the outcomes are risky. The goal is reached through a weakening of the in-
dependence axiom. It is intuitively plausible that riskless and risky prospects are
treated diﬀerently. Chapter 3 presents hence a general model for the gambling
eﬀect, i.e., the eﬀect that risky gambles are evaluated diﬀerently than riskless
outcomes due to an intrinsic utility (or disutility) of gambling. The model has
been alluded to in the economic literature for over a century. However, theoret-
ical models for the eﬀe c ta r ea l m o s ta b s e n t ,p r o b a b l yd u et ot h eh o l i s t i cn a t u r e
of the gambling eﬀect and the entailed violation of stochastic dominance. Only
recently, decision scientists have developed an interest in such basic violations
of rationality conditions such as stochastic dominance. The model studied pro-
vides a tractable theoretical basis for the gambling eﬀect. It accommodates the
Allais paradox while minimally deviating from expected utility, and sheds new
light on risk aversion and on the distinction between von Neumann-Morgenstern-
and neo-classical (riskless) utility. The above-mentioned violations of stochastic
dominance emphasize the descriptive purpose of the chapter.
The design and the results of an experiment on rank-dependence are presented
in Chapter 4. This chapter investigates the empirical performance of rank-
dependent utility and prospect theory for three-outcome gambles. We ﬁnd some
evidence for rank-dependence, but there are many confounding factors that have
stronger eﬀects. The rank-dependence found suggests a rich pattern of phenom-4
ena with optimism, pessimism, and inverse-S shape all present. Our participants
are more risk seeking than predicted by current theories.
The second part of the thesis is devoted to a study, extension, and applications
of the book-making principle by de Finetti (1931). The principle is also known
as Dutch book principle or coherence principle and it states necessary and suﬃ-
cient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of subjective probabilities. The
principle is at the basis of the theory of subjective probabilities, and it is a fun-
damental tool in decision theory: it considerably inﬂuenced Savage’s work. Four
contributions are presented in this thesis.
Chapter 5 formalizes de Finetti’s book-making principle as a static individual
preference condition, so as to avoid the confounding strategic and dynamic eﬀects
of modern formulations that usually consider games with sequential moves be-
tween a bookmaker and a bettor. The Chapter shows how the book-making prin-
ciple, commonly used to justify additive subjective probabilities, can be modiﬁed
to agree with some nonexpected utility models that use nonadditive probabili-
ties. More precisely, a new foundation of the rank-dependent models is presented
that is based on a comonotonic extension of the book-making principle. This
extension excludes book making only if all gambles considered induce the same
rank-ordering of the states of nature through the favorableness of their associ-
ated outcomes. Typical features of rank-dependence such as hedging, ambiguity
aversion, and pessimism and optimism can be accommodated. Suggestions for
the empirical measurement of nonadditive probabilities are given. This contribu-
tion can be seen from several diﬀerent points of view. Not only is the result a
nonadditive extension/adaptation of de Finetti’s principle, but also it is the un-
certainty counterpart of Yaari (1987). Furthermore this result can be interpreted
as a return to Preston & Baratta (1948), one of the earliest works in empirical
psychology explaining behavior of people under uncertainty through transfor-
mation of probabilities instead of transformation of outcomes. This theoretical
environment of a nonadditive version of the book-making principle is tested in
Chapter 4.
Then Chapter 6, building on the previous, provides a general framework of analy-
sis for the principle in a nonadditive probability setting. While Chapter 5 focuses
mainly on behavioral violations of the classic de Finetti-principle, with no search1. Introduction 5
for maximal mathematical generality, Chapter 6 aims to present de Finetti’s
book-making principle in a more general environment. The result shows that it
is possible to ﬁnd a new unifying foundation for several nonadditive models based
on de Finetti’s principle. Particular cases are given by comonotonic and aﬃnely
related Dutch books that lead to Choquet expectations and Min expectations.
As an economics application of the book-making principle, an analysis of welfare
situations and social choice is being carried on in Chapter 7. The goal is to state
a coherence condition for income allocation over a population in the spirit of the
book-making principle. The previous chapters have shown that this principle
is well known and accepted in the theory of probability, extensively studied in
the mathematical literature and in decision theory, where it can be extended
to several nonadditive models. It is also interesting to analyze its implications
in the ﬁeld of welfare economics. The structure of the argumentation is similar
to the original one while the terminology is slightly diﬀerent. States of nature
are substituted by agents, probabilities by weights assigned to the agents, and
the gambles by allocations. Allocations describe the monetary pay-oﬀ for each
agent when a policy is implemented by a government. The result shows that
to aggregate preferences over allocations in a linear manner, the following is
required: a weak order, the constant equivalent, and no Dutch book allowed. The
new principle hence provides a foundation for utilitarianism that is alternative to
Harsanyi’s. The appeal of this principle for welfare economics is that it is based
on natural and intuitive properties.
This thesis is presented as a collection of articles. This presentation has the
advantage of having self-contained chapters: the interested reader can pick up
only the chapters that best ﬁt her inclination. As a drawback, some notation
and deﬁnitions are sometimes repetitive. The results hereafter presented have
been ﬁrst formulated in the following papers: Chapter 2 refers to Diecidue &
Wakker (2000a), Chapter 3 to Diecidue, Schmidt, & Wakker (1999), Chapter
4 to Diecidue, Wakker, & Zeelenberg (2001), Chapter 5 to Diecidue & Wakker
(2000b), Chapter 6 to Diecidue & Maccheroni (2000), Chapter 7 to Diecidue
(2000).6
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9Chapter 2
On the Intuition of
Rank-Dependent Utility
Many models for decision under risk and uncertainty have been proposed that
deviate from classical expected utility. Among the most popular are the rank-
dependent models. They were introduced by Quiggin (1981) for decision under
risk (known probabilities) and by Schmeidler (1989) for decision under uncer-
tainty (unknown probabilities). Rank-dependence has been incorporated in orig-
inal prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979), leading to cumulative prospect
theory (Tversky & Kahneman 1992). The present paper proposes an intuitive jus-
tiﬁcation of rank-dependence, building on Lopes (1984), Weber (1994), and Yaari
(1987). A new derivation of rank-dependent utility is presented that naturally
follows from the intuitive conditions. For intuitive arguments for betweenness
models, see Epstein (1992).
In order to generate fruitful applications, a decision model should satisfy three
requirements. First, it should be mathematically sound. For instance, it should
not exhibit behavioral anomalies such as implausible violations of stochastic
dominance (Fishburn 1978). This ﬁrst requirement can be guaranteed by pref-
erence axiomatizations. For the rank-dependent models, such axiomatizations
were given by Quiggin (1982), Schmeidler (1989), and many others (see Karni &
0The results in this chapter were ﬁrst formulated in Diecidue, Enrico & Peter P. Wakker
(2000), “On the Intuition of Rank-Dependent Utility.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, forth-
coming.
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Schmeidler, 1991, Schmidt, 1998, and Starmer, 2000 for surveys).
The second requirement for a decision model concerns its empirical performance.
It has been found that rank-dependent utility can accommodate several empirical
violations of expected utility. The study of its empirical potential is still going
on today (Abdellaoui & Munier 1999, Birnbaum & McIntosh 1996, Bleichrodt
& Pinto 2000, Gonzalez & Wu 1999, Harless & Camerer 1994, Tversky & Fox
1995).
The third requirement is that the model should be intuitively plausible. Its
concepts should provide new insights and be economically meaningful. Future
connections with concepts from other ﬁelds should be conceivable (nomological
validity). Only a few authors have given intuitive arguments for rank-dependence.
These arguments are scattered around over various papers in diﬀerent ﬁelds.
It has been suggested recently that a complete intuitive foundation of rank-
dependence is still lacking (Luce 1996a p. 85, Luce 1996b p. 304, Safra & Segal
1998 p. 28). Providing such a foundation is the purpose of this paper. We will
argue, using the terminology of Backhouse (1998, p. 1857), that rank-dependence
relates to real-world (psychological) concepts. As suggested by Backhouse, such
arguments are, “in the last resort, informal” (see also Loomes & Sugden 1982, p.
817).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2.1 presents the ﬁr s ta t t e m p tt om o d e l
nonadditive probabilities, commonly used before the 1980s. Section 2.2 describes
the intuition of rank-dependence for decision under risk. The rank-dependent
utility formula follows from this intuition in a natural and elementary manner
(Section 2.3). The intuition also leads to natural ways of modeling pessimism and
optimism, two common attitudes towards probabilistic risk (Section 2.4). Section
2.5 extends the foundation to uncertainty. It shows that Quiggin’s (1981) contri-
bution for risk and Schmeidler’s (1989) contribution for uncertainty can be based
on the same intuition. Using the intuitive foundation of the preceding sections,
Section 2.6 argues that preference conditions and measurement procedures based
on the comonotonicity restriction are not only valid under the rank-dependent
theory but also have merits in the real world. Conclusions and comments are
given in Section 2.7. Appendix A discusses some intuitive arguments for rank-
dependence that were presented before in the literature and Appendix B gives
proofs.2. On the Intuition of Rank-Dependent Utility 13
2.1 The First Attempt
Consider a lottery (p1,x 1;···;pn,x n), yielding outcome xj with probability pj,
j =1 ,...,n. The probabilities p1,...,p n are nonnegative and sum to one. In this
paper, outcomes are real numbers designating money. It is assumed throughout





U is the utility function and the πjs are called decision weights. The decision
weights are nonnegative and sum to one, and will be discussed later. The general
weighting model is not intended to immediately imply operational predictions but
serves as a general point of departure. Intuitive arguments will be formulated in
terms of the model, and operational implications will be established subsequently.
Stochastic dominance is assumed throughout the paper. It means that moving
positive probability mass from an outcome to a strictly higher outcome leads to
a strictly higher evaluation. This assumption implies that the utility function is
strictly increasing (as follows from considering riskless lotteries). We do not yet
make any further assumption about the decision weights, and they may depend
o nt h ee n t i r el o t t e r yf o rn o w .I nad e s c r i p t i v ec o n t e x t ,πj can be interpreted as the
attention given to outcome xj, possibly due to misperception of probability. In
a normative context, πj can be interpreted as an importance weight for outcome
xj that may deliberately have been chosen diﬀerent than the probability pj.
It may be possible to relate decision weights to psychological notions such as
the time span during which the decision maker looks at outcomes (Johnson &
Schkade 1989). An empirical operationalization of decision weights is, however,
not our purpose at this stage. When further assumptions have been added, the
decision weights will become operational.
Utility is assumed to be independent of the lottery under consideration. Like
decision weights, utility is not operational at this stage but will become so later
when further assumptions have been added. Utility can be operationalized if it
is interpreted in the riskless sense of Allais (1953). Expected utility is the special
case of the general weighting model where πj agrees with pj for all j.
As a preparation for what follows, and for historical reasons, we start with the14
2.2. The Intuition and Deﬁnition of
Rank-Dependence for Decision under Risk
following assumption. It will turn out to be too restrictive for our purposes and
will be relaxed later on.
Assumption 2.1 [independence of beliefs from tastes]. The decision weight πj
of receiving outcome xj depends only on the probability pj. ¤
The assumption requires that the decision weight πj is independent of the out-
comes and the other probabilities of the lottery. We can now write w(p) for the
decision weight generated by a probability p,t h u sd e ﬁn i n gaf u n c t i o nw.T h e




As we will see next, the requirement that the w(pj)s sum to one implies expected
utility. The proof is given in Appendix B.
Theorem 2.2 Under Assumption 2.1, the general weighting model (2.1) reduces
to expected utility, i.e. w(p)=p.
To obtain Eq. 2.2 with a nonlinear w function, the requirement that decision
w e i g h t ss u mt oo n ew i l lh a v et ob er e l a x e d .T h i sw a si n d e e dt h ea p p r o a c ho r i g i -
nally taken in the literature (Edwards 1955, Preston & Baratta 1948). The result-
ing model, however, leads to violations of stochastic dominance (Fishburn 1978).
We conclude that a transformation of probabilities, independently of outcomes,
is not well possible. To obtain a decision theory with transformed probabilities,
an additional relaxation of the expected utility principles is required. Such a
relaxation, rank-dependence, was introduced by Quiggin (1981). Its intuition is
explained in the next section and the rest of the paper elaborates on this intuition.
2.2 The Intuition and Deﬁnition of
Rank-Dependence for Decision under Risk
The intuition of rank-dependence entails that the attention given to an outcome
depends not only on the probability of the outcome but also on the favorability2. On the Intuition of Rank-Dependent Utility 15
of the outcome in comparison to the other possible outcomes. To illustrate this







.T h e n h e w i l l p a y m o r e t h a n 1
3 of his attention to outcome
10, the reason being that 10 is the worst outcome. Say that π3, the decision
weight for outcome 10, is 1
2. The decision maker, accordingly, pays relatively
less attention to each of the other outcomes (π1 + π2 = 1
2 if π3 = 1
2). Being
a pessimist, he will pay more than half of the remaining attention to outcome
20 and, hence, π2 > 1
4;s a yπ2 = 1
3. The remainder of the attention, devoted
to outcome 30,i ss m a l l( π1 = 1
6). Next consider the lottery with outcome 20







. The outcome 10 is no longer the worst
outcome and a pessimist will therefore pay less attention to it than in the ﬁrst
lottery. In human behavior, such attitudes are commonly observed in every-
day life. Rank-dependence is a psychologically realistic phenomenon. Savage
(1954, end of Chapter 4) already pointed out that there is no room for expressing
optimism or pessimism in traditional expected utility.
Descriptively, a pessimistic attitude can result from an irrational belief that unfa-
v o r a b l ee v e n t st e n dt oh a p p e nm o r eo f t e n ,l e a d i n gt oa nu n r e a l i s t i co v e r w e i g h t i n g
of unfavorable likelihoods (Murphy’s law). If rank-dependence is taken norma-
tively, then a pessimistic attitude can result from conscious and deliberate deci-
sions. The decision maker may decide that unfavorable outcomes are especially
important in decision making and therefore should receive more attention than
equally likely favorable outcomes (Ellsberg 1961 p. 667, Fellner 1961 p. 681, Lopes
& Oden 1999 p. 310, Weber 1994 p. 236).
Empirically, another kind of rank-dependence is often found, where subjects pay
much attention not only to the worst outcomes but also to the best outcomes.
Less attention is paid to the intermediate outcomes. This phenomenon may
result from extreme outcomes being more noticeable. It once more illustrates the
realistic nature of rank-dependence. A discussion of the phenomenon is given in
Section 2.4.
Further generalizations of expected utility could obviously be considered. To
some extent, the decision weight of an outcome will depend not only on whether
it is better than some other outcome but also on how much better it is. Such
generalizations may be considered in future developments. It should, however,
be kept in mind that a theory should not be too general. The theory should16
2.2. The Intuition and Deﬁnition of
Rank-Dependence for Decision under Risk
Figure 2.1:
be suﬃciently restrictive to allow for speciﬁc predictions. In this sense, rank-
dependence can be considered a pragmatic compromise between generality and
parsimony. It incorporates some major deviations from expected utility but at
the same time provides analytical tractability and speciﬁc empirical predictions.
For the following analysis, we consider rank-ordered lotteries (p1,x 1;···;pn,x n)
with x1 > ··· >x n. Every lottery can obviously be written in this manner by
coalescing identical outcomes and then reordering the outcomes.
The distribution function of the lottery will be used for the formal deﬁnition of
ranking positions (Figure 1). The distribution function assigns to each outcome
the probability of receiving that outcome or anything worse. It orders the out-
comes from best to worst, with value zero assigned to anything below the worst
outcome, value one to anything above the best outcome, and value p to the out-
come for which, in terms of probability mass, a p part of the other outcomes is
worse and a 1−p part is better. Therefore, the ranking position of any outcome
xj is deﬁned as its distribution function, i.e. it is pj + ···+ pn.
Assumption 2.3 [rank-dependence]. The decision weight πj of receiving out-2. On the Intuition of Rank-Dependent Utility 17
come xj depends only on its probability pj and its ranking position. ¤
This assumption has relaxed Assumption 2.1 by also permitting rank-dependence.








position of outcome 10 is 1






, the ranking position
of outcome 12 is also 1
3. The two outcomes also have the same probability. By
Assumption 2.3, they must have the same decision weight.
2.3 Operational Implications: Rank-Dependent
Utility for Risk
With Assumption 2.3 added, the decision weights become operational and em-
pirical predictions can be derived from the decision weights. For example, with
∼ denoting equivalence, assume that
(p1,10;p2,2;p3,1) ∼ (q1,12;q2,2;q3,0).
Then the decision weight of outcome 2 in the left lottery exceeds the correspond-
ing decision weight in the right lottery if and only if, with < denoting preference,
(p1,10;p2,3;p3,1) < (q1,12;q2,3;q3,0).
The claim follows because, under Assumption 2.3, the middle outcomes of the left
lotteries (2 in the upper lottery and 3 in the lower) have the same decision weight
π2,a n dt h em i d d l eo u t c o m e so ft h er i g h tl o t t e r i e s( 2 in the upper lottery and
3 i nt h el o w e r )h a v et h es a m ed e c i s i o nw e i g h tπ0
2. The increase in evaluation of
the left lottery, π2(U(3)−U(2)) apparently exceeds the increase in evaluation of
the right lottery, π0
2(U(3) − U(2)).C o n s e q u e n t l y ,π2 ≥ π0
2. That is, the decision
weights show where to put your money (see Sarin & Wakker, 1998, using an idea
of Gilboa 1987).
We next demonstrate that rank-dependent utility follows from the general weight-
ing model and Assumption 2.3. Assumption 2.3 implies in particular that the
decision weight of a maximal outcome of a lottery depends only on its probabil-
ity p, its ranking position always being one. The function w(p) is deﬁned as this
decision weight. Let us emphasize that w(p) is the decision weight generated by18 2.3. Operational Implications: Rank-Dependent Utility for Risk
the probability p when associated with the best outcome. Obviously, w(0) = 0,
w(1) = 1,a n dw is strictly increasing because of stochastic dominance.
The general rank-dependent formula for the lottery (p1,x 1;···;pn,x n) with x1 >
···>x n can be expressed in terms of the function w. The decision weight π1 is
equal to w(p1) by deﬁnition. We next turn to the decision weight of outcome xi
for some general i. The following observation serves as a preparation.
Observation. The total decision weight assigned to outcomes x1,...,x i, i.e.
π1 + ···+ πi,i sw(p1 + ···+ pi).
Explanation. Consider the lotteries (p1,x 1;···;pi,x i;pi+1,x i+1;···;pn,x n) and
((p1 + ···+ pi),z;pi+1,x i+1;···;pn,x n) for any outcome z exceeding xi+1, e.g.,
z = x1. Because decision weights must sum to one, π1+···+πi =1−πi+1−···−
πn = w(p1 +···+pi), where the second equality can be inferred from inspecting
the second lottery. Crucial in this explanation is that, by Assumption 2.3, the
outcomes xi+1,...,x n all have the same ranking position in the two lotteries and
therefore the same decision weights denoted by πi+1,...,πn. ¤
The decision weight πi of outcome xi is π1 + ···+ πi − (π1 + ···+ πi−1).B y
the preceding observation, πi is equal to w(p1 + ···+ pi) − w(p1 + ···+ pi−1).
Therefore, every decision weight can be expressed in terms of w.I n a g r e e m e n t
with the rank-dependence Assumption 2.3, the decision weight of xi depends only
on its probability pi and its ranking position q = pi +···+pn, because it can be
written as w(pi +1− q) − w(1 − q).
Let us summarize. The model that has been derived is called rank-dependent





where, for each j,
πj = w(p1 + ···+ pj) − w(p1 + ···+ pj−1).
In particular, π1 = w(p1).
Conclusion 2.4 Under the general weighting model (Eq.2.1), stochastic domi-
nance and Assumption 2.3 imply rank-dependent utility.2. On the Intuition of Rank-Dependent Utility 19
The preceding analysis used the function w(p), the decision weight generated by
probability p when associated with the best outcome. An equivalent analysis
could have been presented in terms of a dual function w∗(p), describing the deci-
sion weight generated by probability p when associated with the worst outcome.
The two functions are dual in the sense that w∗(p)=1−w(1−p) for all p.T h i s
duality follows because the decision weights should sum to one for any lottery
(p,M;1− p,m) with outcomes M>m . The analysis can be based both on w
and on w∗, but it should be kept in mind whether the function describes deci-
sion weights of best outcomes or of worst outcomes. In (2.3), πj can as well be
expressed in terms of w∗, πj = w∗(pj +···+pn)−w∗(pj+1 +···+pn) for each j.
w c a nb ec a l l e dt h egoodnews weighting function and w∗ the badnews weighting
function.
The decision weights are now uniquely determined and can be derived from ob-
servable choice. Most empirical studies of decision weights have used simulta-
neous parametric ﬁttings for U and w. Non-parametric ﬁttings still involving
utility estimation were provided by three independent and simultaneous stud-
ies: Abdellaoui (2000), Bleichrodt & Pinto (2000), and Gonzalez & Wu (1999).
Abdellaoui (1999) introduced a parameter-free method for measuring decision
weights without the need to estimate utilities.
Other nonexpected utility models than the rank-dependent ones can be derived
from the general weighting model. For example, if the decision weights do not
depend on the rank-ordering of outcomes but instead on the equivalence class that
a lottery is contained in, then betweenness models result (Chew 1989, Epstein
1992). These models are outside the scope of this paper.
We hope that the preceding explanation has demonstrated that RDU is not solely
a mathematical device for deriving decisions from nonlinear probabilities. The
theory is based on two intuitive assumptions regarding decision making. First,
people process probabilities in a nonlinear manner. Second, the attention people
pay to outcomes depends on how good or bad these outcomes are. The RDU
formula naturally follows from these two intuitive assumptions.20 2.4. Pessimism and Optimism
2.4 Pessimism and Optimism
This section shows how rank-dependence can describe phenomena outside the
domain of expected utility. We ﬁrst consider pessimism. Assume that a lottery
yields outcome x with probability p.L e tq denote the ranking position of x, i.e.
the probability of receiving a lower or equal outcome. The decision weight of x
then is w(p+(1−q))−w(1−q). Under pessimism, improving the ranking position
(increasing the probability q of receiving something not preferred) decreases the
decision weight of x. It is well-known that w(p+(1−q))−w(1−q) is decreasing
in q if and only if w is convex. Hence, pessimism is characterized by a convex
weighting function.
Similarly, optimism corresponds to a decision weight w(p+(1−q))−w(1−q) that
is increasing in q, and thus to a concave weighting function. This rank-dependent
way of modeling pessimism and optimism was suggested before by Quiggin (1982,
p. 335). It was described in full by Yaari (1987, p. 108) and, subsequently, by
many other authors. It is in full agreement with the intuition advanced in this
paper. Similar eﬀects have been demonstrated in other contexts (Viscusi 1997,
p. 1667).
In empirical investigations, many observed weighting functions are not completely
convex or concave but exhibit a mixed pattern. They are concave for small
probabilities and convex for moderate and high probabilities. This pattern is
called inverse-S. It implies that subjects pay much attention to best and worst
outcomes, and little attention to intermediate outcomes (Quiggin 1982, Weber
1994). Its empirical support is reviewed by Wakker (2001). Counterevidence can
b ef o u n di nB i r n b a u m&M c I n t o s h( 1 9 9 6) and Birnbaum & Navarrete (1998).
For a psychological theory about the attention paid to low outcomes (security)
and high outcomes (potential), see Lopes & Oden (1999). The pattern suggests
that people are overly sensitive to changes from impossible to possible and from
possible to certain but are insuﬃciently sensitive to probabilistic information
otherwise (Karmarkar 1978, Tversky & Wakker 1995).
The inverse-S shape predicts that people are optimistic and, hence, risk seeking
for gambles that yield gains with small probabilities such as found in public lot-
teries. People are pessimistic and, hence, risk averse for gambles that yield losses
with small probabilities, which is relevant for insurance. The simultaneous exis-2. On the Intuition of Rank-Dependent Utility 21
tence of gambling and insurance, a classical paradox in economics, can therefore
be explained by the inverse-S pattern (Quiggin 1982).
2.5 The Intuition for Decision under Uncertainty
The analysis of uncertainty, presented in this section, is parallel to the analysis
of risk. Uncertainty is, however, more interesting because subjective degrees of
belief can play a role. Risk is the special case of uncertainty where probabili-
ties are unambiguously known. We brieﬂy describe the uncertainty framework.
As e to fstates (of nature) S is given. This set is considered to be an exhaus-
tive list of mutually exclusive states: one and only one state will be the true
state, but the decision maker is uncertain about which that will be. Subsets of
S are called events. As in Section 2.1, the outcome set is assumed to be IR.
Acts are ﬁnite-valued functions from S to IR. The generic notation of an act
is (E1,x 1;···;En,x n). This act yields outcome xj if the true state belongs to
event Ej. It is implicitly understood in this notation that the events (E1,...,E m)
partition the state space.
We assume that the act (E1,x 1;···;En,x n) is evaluated by the following formula,




U denotes the utility function and the πjsa r edecision weights. Decision weights
are nonnegative and sum to 1. We assume monotonicity, i.e. if for some states of
nature the outcomes of an act are replaced by better outcomes then the resulting
act is weakly preferred to the original act. This implies that the utility function
is nondecreasing. The utility function is assumed to be non-constant so as to
avoid triviality. No assumption is yet made about the πjs and they are permitted
to depend on the act in any possible manner. Subjective expected utility (SEU)
is the special case where the πjsa r esubjective probabilities,i . e .t h ef o l l o w i n gt w o
assumptions hold.
Assumption 2.5 [independence of beliefs from tastes]. The decision weight πj
of an event Ej depends only on the event itself. ¤22 2.5. The Intuition for Decision under Uncertainty
With Assumption 2.5 satisﬁed, the following assumption can be formulated:
Condition 2.6 [additivity]. The decision weight πA∪B of a disjoint union A∪B
is the sum πA + πB of the decision weights of the separate events A and B. ¤
There is much interest in relaxations of Assumption 2.6. First, it is psycholog-
ically plausible that people perceive likelihood in a nonlinear manner, a phe-
nomenon which is usually more pronounced under uncertainty than under risk
(Currim & Sarin 1989, Fellner 1961 p. 684, Tversky & Wakker 1998, Weber 1994).
A nonlinear processing seems to be as plausible for probabilities as for outcomes,
and therefore probability transformation seems to be as useful for descriptive
purposes as utility. Second, nonadditive measures of belief, such as Dempster-
Shafer belief functions, are extensively used in artiﬁcial intelligence (Dempster
1967, Shafer 1976). Unfortunately, a relaxation of only Assumption 2.6 while
maintaining full independence of beliefs from tastes turns out to be impossible.
Theorem 2.7 Eq. 2.4 and Assumption 2.5 imply subjective expected utility (thus
Assumption 2.6).
Theorem 2.7 can be interpreted as a negative result. Nonadditive measures can-
not be implemented in decisions if Assumption 2.5 is to be maintained. We there-
fore turn to a weakening of Assumption 2.5. The weakening could be interpreted
as giving up independence of beliefs from tastes. However, once Assumption 2.5
is given up, the interpretation of decision weights as indexes of belief, already
questionable under expected utility, becomes highly problematic. The interpre-
tation of nonadditive measures, which are simply the decision weights of good- or
badnews events, as indexes of belief is, obviously, similarly problematic. Another,
more plausible, interpretation of decision weights is therefore that they are not
pure indexes of belief. They may also comprise a component of decision attitude,
in addition to the belief component. Under such an interpretation, a decomposi-
tion of decision weights into the belief and decision component can be conjectured
(Epstein 1999, Tversky & Wakker 1998, Wu & Gonzalez 1999). For consistency
with traditional terminology, the name of Assumption 2.5 is maintained.
A relaxation of Assumption 2.5 that permits nonadditive measures is provided
by Choquet expected utility (CEU), introduced by Schmeidler (1989). His model2. On the Intuition of Rank-Dependent Utility 23
can be based on the intuition of rank-dependence. That is, the attention paid to
an event depends not only on the event but also on how good the outcome yielded
by the event is in comparison to the outcomes yielded by the other events. This
is the way in which subjective expected utility is generalized.
For the following analysis, consider rank-ordered acts (E1,x 1;···;En,x n),w i t h
x1 > ···>x n. For event Ej,t h eranking position is identiﬁed with the event of
receiving a worse or equivalent outcome, i.e. it is Ej ∪ ···∪En. Sarin & Wakker
(1998) used the term dominating event for the complement of the ranking posi-
tion. The following analysis is similar to the analysis under risk. It is presented
concisely but in full because it demonstrates the similarity of RDU under risk and
CEU under uncertainty, thus the similarity of Quiggin’s (1981) and Schmeidler’s
(1989) ideas.
Assumption 2.8 [rank-dependence]. The decision weight πj of an event Ej de-
pends only on the event and its ranking position. ¤
Next, Choquet expected utility is derived from Assumption 2.8. The assumption
implies in particular that the decision weight of a maximal outcome of a lottery
depends only on the associated event E, the ranking position always being the
universal event. W(E) can now be deﬁned as this decision weight. W(E) is
therefore the decision weight generated by the event E when associated with
the best outcome. W is a capacity,i . e .( 1 )W(∅)=0 ,( 2 )W(S)=1 ,a n d( 3 )
W is nondecreasing with respect to set inclusion. (Condition (3) follows from
consideration of acts (A,x;B ∪ C,y) and (A ∪ B,x;C,y) with U(x) >U (y).
Monotonicity implies preference for the ﬁrst act, which implies that W(A∪B) ≥
W(A).)
We express the general weighting model in terms of the capacity W.C o n s i d e r
the act (E1,x 1;···;En,x n). We assume that the events have been rank-ordered
such that x1 > ···>x n. The decision weight π1 is by deﬁnition equal to W(E1).
Next consider a general i.
Observation. The total decision weight assigned to outcomes x1,...,x i, i.e.
π1 + ···+ πi,i sW(E1 ∪ ···∪ Ei).
Explanation. Consider the acts (E1,x 1;···;Ei,x i;Ei+1,x i+1;···;En,x n) and
((E1 ∪ ···∪ Ei),z;Ei+1,x i+1;···;En,x n) for any outcome z exceeding xi+1, e.g.,24 2.5. The Intuition for Decision under Uncertainty
z = x1. Because decision weights must sum to one, π1+···+πi =1 − πi+1−···−
πn = W(E1∪···∪Ei). Note that, by Assumption 2.8, the outcomes xi+1,...,x n
all have the same ranking position in the two acts and therefore the same decision
weights. ¤
The observation implies that the decision weight πi of event Ei is the diﬀerence
W(E1 ∪···∪Ei)−W(E1 ∪···∪Ei−1). It is standard that this diﬀerence is π1 =
W(E1) for i =1 . The rank-ordering of the events was crucial in our analysis. Let
us summarize and give the formal deﬁnition of Choquet expected utility (CEU).






πj = W(E1 ∪ ···∪ Ej) − W(E1 ∪ ···∪ Ej−1).
Conclusion 2.9 Under the general weighting model (Eq.2.4), monotonicity and
Assumption 2.8 imply CEU.
Empirical measurements of decision weights have been described by Fox, Rogers,
& Tversky (1996), Fox & Tversky (1995), Kilka & Weber (1999), and Wu & Gon-
zalez (1999). We hope that the preceding explanation clariﬁes that the intuitive
basis of CEU is the same as of RDU. Thus, a psychological background has also
resulted for Schmeidler’s (1989) Choquet expected utility. It will be argued in the
next section that, given this intuition, the comonotonicity condition is not just a
mathematical tool but is a natural concept. Let us now turn to a discussion of
pessimism.
Pessimism means again that the attention paid to an event gets higher as the event
gets rank-ordered worse. That is, assume that event E yields outcome x and D is
the ranking position of E. Then the decision weight of E is W(Dc∪E)−W(Dc).
Under pessimism, worsening the ranking position (decreasing the event D of
receiving something worse) increases the decision weight of E.T h a ti s ,i fC ⊂ D,
then
W(C
c ∪ E) − W(C
c) ≥ W(D
c ∪ E) − W(D
c). (2.6)
Similar to risk, a capacity W satisfying Eq. 2.6 is called convex. Eq. 2.6 can be
rewritten as W(A∪B)+W(A∩B) ≥ W(A)+W(B) after appropriate substitution2. On the Intuition of Rank-Dependent Utility 25
of symbols (left to the reader). Optimism is similarly characterized by concavity
of the capacity, i.e. Eq. 2.6 with ≤ instead of ≥.
2.6 Coalescing and Comonotonicity
Both in risk and in uncertainty, the rank-dependent formulas have been given for
distinct outcomes x1 > ···>x n. Eqs. 2.3 and 2.5 can also be used if the inequal-
ities are weak, i.e. x1 ≥ ···≥ xn. These claims follow from substitution and are
left to the reader. For an act (E1,x 1;···;En,x n) with xi = xi+1, the decision
weight and the ranking position of event Ei depend on the chosen rank-ordering
between xi and xi+1. This choice can be made arbitrarily and is immaterial for
the associated preferences.
We next discuss comonotonicity, introduced by Schmeidler (1989). The con-
dition has sometimes been criticized. An explanation of its intuition there-
fore seems to be worthwhile. For simplicity, assume a ﬁnite state space S =
{s1,...,s n}. For a permutation (ρ1,...,ρ n) of (1,...,n), consider the set Cρ =
©
f ∈ IR n : fρ1 ≥ ···≥ fρn
ª
. It can be seen that Cρ is a convex cone. For all acts
in the cone Cρ, we can use the same decision weights πρj determined by
πρj := W(sρ1,...,s ρj) − W(sρ1,...,s ρj−1)
in the computation of CEU. If acts are in the same cone, then fi >f j and gj >g i
for no states si and sj. Acts belonging to the same cone are called comonotonic.
Within comonotonic sets, CEU coincides with an SEU functional. This SEU
functional is deﬁned by taking the CEU utility function and taking as probabilities
the decision weights πρj associated with the comonotonic set. Therefore, CEU
exhibits many characteristics of SEU within comonotonic sets. In particular, it
satisﬁes the same preference axioms.
The comonotonic agreement of CEU with SEU is implied by the theory but is also
empirically interesting. Consider acts belonging to diﬀerent comonotonic sets.
The states of nature are rank-ordered diﬀerently for such acts. This diﬀerence
will enhance variations in the psychological attention paid to the states. Subjects
will exhibit more pronounced violations of SEU, due to pessimism, optimism, etc.
When only acts are considered from one comonotonic set, fewer violations of SEU26 2.7. Conclusion
can be expected. According to CEU theory,t h ee ﬀects of pessimism and optimism
will then be kept constant. In reality, they can be expected to be smaller than
when the rank-ordering of the acts varies.
Comonotonicity is extensively used in preference axiomatizations of CEU. Most
axiomatizations consist of restricting the SEU axioms to comonotonic acts. For a
continuum of outcomes, CEU holds as soon as SEU holds within every comonotonic
set (this is easily derived from Wakker & Tversky 1993, Proposition 8.2). An
empirical application of comonotonicity can be found in utility measurement.
Wakker & Deneﬀe (1996) demonstrated that utility can be measured under CEU
by restricting SEU techniques to comonotonic sets of acts. Such a restriction has
the empirical advantage of avoiding the biases generated by rank-dependence,
and therefore seems desirable.
Some authors have pointed out that rank-dependence and comonotonicity are of-
ten used as technical tools and that there is still a need for an intuitive foundation
(Luce 1996a p. 85, Luce 1996b p. 304, Safra & Segal 1998 p. 28). Our paper has
provided such a foundation, building on ideas described before in the literature.
We have argued that rank-dependence and comonotonicity do have intuitive and
empirical merit. Yaari (1987, p. 104) already emphasized the intuitive impor-
tance of comonotonicity when discussing his central axiom (dual independence):
“The foregoing proposition makes it clear that the economic interpretation of
dual independence lies in the intuitive meaning of comonotonicity.”
Obviously, alternative derivations of CEU and RDU that do not use rank-dependence
or comonotonicity in their axioms are also interesting. Such derivations are given
by Luce (1998) and Safra & Segal (1998). In these derivations, rank-dependence
follows from other conditions.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper has argued that RDU is not just a mathematical device but that it is
based on intuition and has real-world merits. The intuition of rank-dependence
was described in terms of decision weights. The RDU formula naturally fol-
lowed as well as empirically meaningful preference conditions. Optimism and
pessimism were explained in terms of the intuitive foundation. An analogous2. On the Intuition of Rank-Dependent Utility 27
reasoning was applied to the uncertainty case and a psychological background
for Schmeidler’s (1989) Choquet expected utility resulted. Once the intuition
understood, comonotonicity conditions and rank-dependence are no longer mere
theoretical tools. They become natural concepts upon which preference condi-
tions, empirical tests, and improvements of utility measurement can be based.
Our preference for RDU, and we believe also its general popularity, are based
not only on its mathematical or empirical performance but also on an intuitive
aspect of the model: nonlinear weighting of chance, and nonadditive measures of
belief, have the potential of becoming useful concepts, not only in economics but
also in other areas such as psychology and artiﬁcial intelligence.
Appendix A. Related Literature on The Intuition
of Rank-Dependence
This appendix discusses some intuitive arguments for rank-dependence that have
been presented in the literature. A ﬁrst example from the psychological literature
is Birnbaum’s (1974) study of the formation of personality impressions. For ex-
ample, Birnbaum studied the likableness of a person on the basis of intellectuality,
shyness, loyalty, etc. He found empirical violations of additive aggregation and
proposed a conﬁgural weighting model that better describes how intellectuality
etc. are aggregated into likableness of a person. Under conﬁgural weighting, “...
the weight of a stimulus depends upon its rank within the set to be judged” (page
559). Although this model is formally diﬀerent from RDU, it does already contain
an intuition of rank-dependence. Conﬁgural weighting theory was later extended
to risky choices (Birnbaum & Navarrete 1998 and the references therein).
A remarkable study is Lopes (1984) who argued for the intuitive value of rank-
dependence in risk theory as an extension of the Gini index of inequality. The
rank-dependent aspect of such measures of inequality was formulated by her as
“ ... embody distributional objectives in terms of the relative weight given to
inequality at diﬀerent points on the income scale ... The central psychological
premise in this article is that people’s intuitions about risks are functionally sim-
ilar to intuitions about distributional inequality. ...representation that captures
psychologically salient features of risky distributions” (p. 468). She then ex-28 Appendix
plained that people, well aware of the objective probabilities, still “may wish to
weight outcomes diﬀerently at diﬀerent points in the distribution” and discusses
human ways of reasoning reﬂecting this procedure (p. 469). Experiments were
presented to test for the role of rank-dependence. Lopes concluded that rank-
dependence (called the distributional model) “...seems to oﬀer the potential of
capturing in a psychologically meaningful way many interesting and important
features of people’s processing of and preference for risks” (p. 484).
Let us emphasize that Lopes (1984) derived her ideas solely from intuition and
psychological principles. No preference axioms were considered. Her work was
developed independently of Quiggin (1981, 1982) or other presentations of RDU.
Lopes (1987) presented experiments where subjects were asked to speak aloud
about their motives for choices between multiple outcomes gambles. It turned
out that subjects paid much attention to goodnews events (receiving at least as
much as ...) and, similarly, badnews events. This attention is formalized through
the probability weighting function in rank-dependent theories. Rank-dependent
decision weights then result from diﬀerence-taking. The great attention to good-
and bad-news events also supports the inverse-S shapes of the weighting functions.
A third example from the psychological literature is Weber (1994). She used
as o m e w h a td i ﬀerent approach than this paper, invoking an analogy with esti-
mation theory and asymmetric loss functions, and concluded “these processes
need not necessarily be perceptual in origin. Instead, in this article, I argued
that conﬁgural or rank-dependent weighting could be interpreted as strategic or
motivational (i.e. a reasonable response that takes into consideration existing
constraints that are ignored by the expected utility model)” (p. 236). On p. 237
she discussed perceptual origins (“attentional salience”): “... and more extreme
outcomes may get greater weight than outcomes in the middle of the distribution,
simply because they are more noticeable.”
Models that pay special attention to highest or lowest outcomes can be considered
to be special cases of rank-dependence. An example is Rawls’ (1971) proposal for
welfare evaluation, where all importance weight is allocated to the poorest person
in the society. Rank-dependent models for welfare were developed by Ebert (1988)
and Weymark (1981). Similar models, with the importance weight divided over
the highest and lowest outcomes, were proposed by Arrow and Hurwicz (1972)
and Hurwicz (1951). Models that deviate from expected utility only by over-2. On the Intuition of Rank-Dependent Utility 29
weighting highest and/or lowest outcomes were proposed by Bell (1985), Cohen
(1992), Gilboa (1988), and Jaﬀray (1988). In time preference, rank-dependence
arises when people are especially sensitive to decreases in salary. This is a special
case of rank-dependence, related to the immediately preceding period (Gilboa
1989, Shalev 1997).
Yaari (1987) related the intuitive meaning of comonotonicity to hedging. Hedging
concerns combinations of outcomes and therefore requires a linear structure on
the outcome set. For example, consider two gambles for money on the same toss
of a coin. The ﬁr s tg a m b l ei s(H,30;T,10), yielding $30 if heads comes up and
$10 if tails comes up. The second gamble is (H,10;T,30). These two gambles
are equivalent but their ﬁfty-ﬁfty-outcomes-mixture (H,20;T,20) is usually pre-
ferred. In the mixture, a reduction of risk has resulted. Hedging occurs because
the good outcome of one lottery neutralizes the bad outcome of the other lot-
tery and vice versa. The lotteries serve as complementary goods. The described
neutralization can occur only because the gambles are not comonotonic. Hence,
Yaari argued that an independence condition (his Axiom A5) is natural only in
the absence of hedging, i.e. only for comonotonic gambles. A similar argument
was presented by Röell (1987). Hedging is central in the portfolio selection of
assets.
Schmeidler (1989) used a similar framework that generalizes Yaari’s model in two
respects. First, Yaari considered real-valued outcomes (interpreted as money),
whereas Schmeidler dealt with general convex outcome sets (interpreted as prob-
ability distributions over prizes). Second, Schmeidler assumed states of nature
for which no probabilities need to be given. Yaari’s model can be considered the
special case of Schmeidler’s model where probabilities of the states of nature are
given and outcomes are one-dimensional.
We next discuss Quiggin (1982). He ﬁrst discussed what he called the primitive
approach, i.e. our Eq. 2.2, transforming only probabilities of ﬁxed outcomes, and
pointed out: “the fundamental problem in these theories is that any two out-
comes with the same probability must have the same decision weight. This fails
to take account of the fact that while individuals may distort the probability of an
extreme outcome in some way, they need not treat intermediate outcomes with
the same probability in the same fashion.” A similar intuition can be recognized
in Fellner (1961, p. 674/675). So as to formalize this observation, Quiggin pro-30 Appendix
posed to order the possible outcomes xi and the corresponding probabilities pi
in each prospect and denoted the rank-ordered probability vector (p1,...,p n) by
p. Quoting again from his paper: “The anticipated utility function is deﬁned to
be V = h(p)U(x)=
P
i hi(p)U(xi) where U is a utility function with properties
similar to that of von Neumann-Morgenstern, while h(p) is a vector of decision
weights satisfying
P
i hi(p)=1 . In general, hi(p) depends on all the pjsa n d
not just on pi. Thus, for example, the fact that pj = pk would not imply that
hj(p)=hk(p).”
Quiggin’s formula is a special case of the general weighting model where the deci-
sion weights are independent of the outcomes given the rank-ordered probability
vector p. Quiggin gave preference conditions to characterize his formula. He
then showed that RDU follows from a continuity condition. The purpose of our
analysis was diﬀerent. We did not invoke technical conditions such as continuity
in the derivation but derived rank-dependence from intuitive arguments.
Appendix B. Proofs
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2 . 2 . Decision weights always sum to one and, hence, w(p1+
p2)=1− w(1 − p1 − p2)=w(p1)+w(p2).C o n s e q u e n t l y , w satisﬁes Cauchy’s
equation. By Aczél (1966), w must be linear. Note here that w is bounded by 0
and 1 so that no nonlinear solutions to the Cauchy equation are possible. w is
the identity function because w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1. ¤
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2 . 7 . For each event E,d e ﬁne W(E) as the decision weight
of that event. W(E) is nonnegative, W(∅)=0 ,a n dW(S)=1 . Decision weights
of partitions always sum to one, therefore W(E1 ∪ E2)=1− W((E1 ∪ E2)c)=
W(E1)+W(E2). W is a probability measure and SEU follows. ¤2. On the Intuition of Rank-Dependent Utility 31
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The gambling eﬀect entails that people process risky choice options in a diﬀerent
way than riskless ones, due to an intrinsic utility for the presence or absence of
risk. The eﬀect is intuitively convincing and easy to state, and has been alluded
to throughout the history of risky choice. Strangely enough, theoretical studies of
the eﬀect are virtually absent. This paper discusses the history of the eﬀect and
provides a theoretical study based on new developments in utility theory. Section
3.2 describes the history and motivates the development of a theoretical model.
Section 3.3 discusses some basic interpretations of the gambling eﬀect. The most
common way of describing the gambling eﬀe c ti st o og e n e r a lt og i v ep r e d i c t i o n s ,
which may have contributed to the virtual absence of theoretical studies until
now. Section 3.4 describes related literature in some detail. Section 3.5 proposes
a theoretical model for the gambling eﬀect and gives a preference foundation for
it, combining and building on earlier results by Fishburn (1980) and Schmidt
(1998). The preference foundation shows how to test the model and how to
measure its parameters. Section 3.6 demonstrates, in the classical von Neumann-
0The results in this chapter were ﬁrst formulated in Diecidue, Enrico, Ullrich Schmidt &
Peter P. Wakker (1999), “The Gambling Eﬀect Reconsidered.” CentER, Tilburg University,
Tilburg, The Netherlands.
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Morgenstern set-up with no restrictions on outcomes, that the gambling eﬀect
model necessarily violates stochastic dominance. Section 3.6 demonstrates how
the gambling eﬀect confounds traditional measurements of risk aversion and how
such a confounding can be avoided. Section 3.8 concludes, and proofs are given
in the Appendix.
3.2 History and Motivation
History of the gambling eﬀect. Throughout the history of utility theory, authors
have alluded to the gambling eﬀect. It underlies much of the commonly observed
risk aversion (Royden, Suppes, & Walsh 1959), and may have confounded empir-
ical investigations into risk attitudes (Conlisk 1993). The eﬀect was mentioned
by von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944, pp. 28, 629, 632), and was considered
the main cause of deviation from expected utility in the economic literature up
to 1944 (Schlee 1992). Conlisk (1993) gives an extensive survey of the literature,
including a considerable amount of empirical evidence. Pope (1995) gives fur-
ther historical citations. A humorous normative criticism of the gambling eﬀect
comes from Marshall (1890): “ ...and we are thrown back upon the induction
that pleasures of gambling are in Bentham’s phrase “impure”; since experience
shows that they are likely to engender a restless, feverish character, unsuited for
steady work as well as for the higher and more solid pleasures of life.” (p. 843 in
1920 ed.)
Absence of theory due to violation of stochastic dominance. Observation 3.7 in
this paper will give an explanation for the virtual absence of theoretical models of
the gambling eﬀect: something as basic as stochastic dominance has to be violated
to model the eﬀect. Such violations have usually been considered normatively
undesirable. For many years, systematic violations of stochastic dominance were
also considered descriptively undesirable because they seem to be implausible. In
addition, descriptive models should satisfy some minimal rationality conditions
in order to be tractable and to permit theoretical derivations, and stochastic
dominance was usually considered to be one of those rationality conditions.
The demonstrated violation of stochastic dominance allows for a new speculation
on a text in von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944): “ concepts like a ‘speciﬁc util-
ity of gambling’ cannot be formulated free of contradiction on this level. But3. The Gambling Eﬀect Reconsidered 39
anybody who has seriously tried to axiomatize that elusive concept, will probably
concur with it” (p. 28 including footnote 3). Possibly, when alluding to a contra-
diction, von Neumann & Morgenstern foresaw a violation of something as basic
as stochastic dominance.1 Tversky (1967) also suggested that an axiomatization
of the gambling eﬀect is impossible (p. 198).
Recent interest in basic violations of rationality. During the last decades, it has
become understood that empirical models of decision making have to incorporate
basic violations of rationality, primarily due to ﬁndings from the psychological
literature. The preference reversal eﬀect (Lichtenstein & Slovic 1971, Lindman
1971) was a ﬁrst signal of rationality violations at a very basic level. Framing
eﬀects (Tversky & Kahneman 1981) provided another signal. Tversky & Kahne-
man (1986) developed a clever example where violations of stochastic dominance
can be generated systematically for the majority of subjects. Starmer & Sug-
den (1993) formalized the underlying eﬀe c tt h a tt h e yc a l l e dt h ee v e n ts p l i t t i n g
eﬀect. It was further reﬁned and conﬁrmed in several papers by Birnbaum and co-
authors (e.g., Birnbaum & Navarrete 1998). In legal settings and organizations,
ineﬃcient procedures may be unavoidable for the purpose of reducing moral haz-
ard and adverse selection.2 Violations of stochastic dominance are also generated
in regret theory (Quiggin 1990).
Impact on the measurement of risk attitude. Under expected utility, a special
preference for riskless outcomes is deﬁned as risk aversion and modeled through
concave utility (Arrow 1953). Several generalizations have been proposed during
the last decades, such as the certainty eﬀect of prospect theory (Kahneman &
Tversky 1979). Here probabilities are transformed into decision weights. The
transformation function is assumed to decrease steeply at certainty (p =1 ),
leading to an additional preference for riskless outcomes such as exhibited in the
Allais paradox and in uncertainty aversion for the case of unknown probabilities
(Dow & Werlang 1992, Schmeidler 1989). These phenomena are beyond the
1At other places, e.g., p. 632, von Neumann & Morgenstern suggest that reduction of com-
pound lotteries should be abandoned so as to accommodate for a utility of gambling. Our paper
does not consider compound gambles.
2E.g., the 1980 Superfund U.S. law requires 100% cleanup results of hazardous waste left in
the ground so as to reduce risk to zero. Much money must be spent on the last 10%, money
which would be more eﬃciently spent on other places now left unattended. Besides game-
theoretic explanations due to asymmetric information, also the gambling eﬀect will contribute
to such phenomena.40 3.2. History and Motivation
realm of expected utility. Modern variations, through rank-dependent utility
(Quiggin 1981), cumulative prospect theory (Luce & Fishburn 1991, Tversky &
Kahneman 1992), and other models (Dekel 1986, Loomes & Sugden 1982) have
been proposed. All of these models have in common that the special preference
for riskless options is smooth, i.e. there is no categorical diﬀerence between risky
and riskless options but a gradual one. If lotteries are risky but close to riskless
then their evaluation is also close to the riskless evaluation.
The gambling eﬀect as modeled in this paper entails a more drastic form of
the certainty eﬀect, where the transition from certainty to risk is abrupt and
discontinuous. Such a transition is empirically plausible. As soon as a sure
outcome is changed into a risky gamble, no matter how small the risk is, new
emotions are triggered. People abandon their riskless evaluation process and turn
to another evaluation process, for risky choices, instead.
Risky versus riskless utility. Diﬀerent evaluations for risky and riskless options
have been proposed in other contexts. For instance, Dyer & Sarin (1982), and
many other papers (surveyed in Wakker 1994, Section 2), have proposed that
expected utility with a utility function u be used for risky choices, but a diﬀerent
function v, called value function, be used for riskless choices. Examples of risk-
less evaluations are intertemporal, welfare, or strength of preference judgments.
This distinction between utility and value has been widely accepted (Dyer &
Sarin 1982), although some authors have suggested modiﬁcations (Stalmeier &
Bezembinder 1998, Wakker 1994). Our model takes the diﬀerence between risky
and riskless evaluations one step further than the Dyer & Sarin model. For a
preference between a riskless outcome x and a risky lottery P,t h eD y e r&S a r i n
model assumes that both x and P be evaluated through u and its expectation.
Our model proposes that already in the choice between x and P,t h ev a l u eo f
x be v(x) and not u(x). Whereas the Dyer & Sarin model is within the realm
of expected utility, ours is not. Another deviation is that, contrary to the Dyer
& Sarin model, we need not require that u and v order outcomes in the same
manner. Furthermore, we obtain a cardinal riskless utility that is derived from
observable preferences only and thus does not invoke another empirical primitive
such as direct judgments of strengths of preferences such as used by Dyer & Sarin.
Eﬃcient explanation of the Allais paradox. The gambling eﬀect describes the
Allais paradox while minimally deviating from expected utility. As long as no3. The Gambling Eﬀect Reconsidered 41
riskless options are involved, expected utility is completely satisﬁed. Only when
riskless options are involved does the model deviate from expected utility. Many
empirical investigations have suggested that violations of expected utility are pri-
marily due to boundary eﬀects, i.e. drastic changes in the evaluation process when
the number of positive-probability outcomes is changed (Conlisk 1989, Harless &
Camerer 1994, Sopher & Gigliotti 1993). Formal models describing such changes
in evaluation have been proposed (Humphrey 1998, Luce 2000, Neilson 1992,
Viscusi 1989). In fact, the often-discussed violation of stochastic dominance by
original prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) is due to a similar eﬀect.
The simplest and strongest form of the boundary eﬀect, leading to the strongest
violations of expected utility, is the certainty eﬀect. It describes people’s spe-
cial preference for riskless options (Cohen & Jaﬀray 1988, Kahneman & Tversky
1979). The gambling eﬀect model captures this eﬀect in an eﬃcient manner.
3.3 Basic Ways to Model the Gambling Eﬀect
The gambling eﬀect is often alluded to in general terms, as follows. A preference
x < P between a sure outcome x and a risky lottery P holds if and only if the
following formula holds:
W(x) ≥ W(P) − C(x,P). (3.1)
W is a preference functional from some risk theory –it will be expected utility in
this paper. C does not refer to an intrinsic value of x or P but instead describes
a holistic cost of the presence or absence of gambling. Costs of gambling may
contribute to risk aversion such as exhibited in insurance, the equity premium
puzzle, etc. Negative costs, so a positive utility of gambling, may underlie public
lotteries, horse race betting, gambling in casinos, risky investments, and the start
of new enterprises.
Without further restrictions, the gambling eﬀect model does not have any im-
plication for preference and even permits intransitivities. For instance, we can
set C(x,P)+W(x) − W(P) equal to 1 whenever x is preferred to P,e q u a lt o
0 whenever x is indiﬀerent to P, and equal to −1 whenever P is preferred to x,
thus accommodating any arbitrary preference relation. Tversky (1967) probably
had this point in mind when he wrote in pessimistic terms about the gambling4 2 3 . 3 .B a s i cW a y st oM o d e lt h eG a m b l i n gE ﬀect
eﬀect: “In spite of its apparent appeal, this approach does not yield testable pre-
dictions” (p. 198). To generate empirically meaningful predictions, restrictions
must be imposed on C.
Two approaches have been considered to ensure transitivity and extend the model
to other choices than between a risky and a riskless gamble. In each approach, a
separate evaluation of x and P is established (Cubitt & Sugden 1999, p. 770). In
the ﬁrst approach, C depends only on P, in the second approach C depends only
on x.I nt h eﬁrst approach the costs can be written as C(P), and transitivity is
satisﬁed with W(P)−C(P) the value of the gamble P and C t h eh o l i s t i cc o s to f
gambling. In the second approach, the costs can be written as C(x). Transitivity
is satisﬁed with W(x)+C(x) t h ev a l u eo ft h er i s k l e s so u t c o m ex and C the beneﬁt
of certainty. At the end of the appendix, we will demonstrate that the second
approach can always be rewritten as a special case of the ﬁrst approach, with the
cost function C(P) linear in P.
As common in the literature on the gambling eﬀect, we assume that preferences
between risky lotteries agree with expected utility. The only deviation from
expected utility that is considered is due to the gambling eﬀect. Generalizations
permitting more deviations are left to future studies. Tversky (1967) suggested
such a generalization, considering gambles with only one nonzero outcome and
permitting nonlinear probability transformation there.
In the ﬁrst approach, where C depends on P, the model is too general if any
dependency is permitted. Then, irrespective of W, the model can accommo-
date almost any transitive relation by taking C accordingly. Therefore Fishburn
(1980), the only decision-theoretic work on the ﬁr s ta p p r o a c ht h a tw ea r ea w a r e
of, added further restrictions. These, however, turn out to imply that his model
becomes a special case of the second approach as will be demonstrated in Section
3.4. Observation 3.7, demonstrating violation of stochastic dominance for the
second approach, therefore also applies to Fishburn’s model.
Our paper follows the second approach. Risky gambles P will be evaluated by
expected utility with respect to a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u.
Riskless outcomes x are evaluated by a riskless function v(x) (equal to W(x)+
C(x) in the notation of Eq. 3.1). The model can have a normative interpretation
in the case of transaction costs. For instance, if a sure outcome x could be
collected right away but for any risky gamble a contract would have to be signed3. The Gambling Eﬀect Reconsidered 43
to settle conditional agreements, then C could designate the cost of the contract.
An alternative example arises if riskless outcomes can be consumed right away
but risky outcomes can be consumed only after the resolution of some uncertainty
that aﬀects the value of the outcomes (diﬀerent tax imposed, etc.). Finally, C
can represent relevant aspects other than the direct outcomes (e.g., compensating
externalities in lotteries for funding public goods in Morgan & Sefton 2000).
3.4 Related Literature
This section discusses related works on the gambling eﬀect in some detail. We ﬁrst
discuss the decision-theoretic models by Fishburn (1980), Schmidt (1998), and
Luce & Marley (2000). The ﬁrst approach described in the preceding section, i.e.
Eq. 3.1 with C depending only on P, was the starting point in Fishburn (1980).
We ﬁrst discuss his central representation, Theorem 3. Fishburn assumed that
not only W−C,b u ta l s oW in isolation, represents preferences over risky gambles.
This implies that C is a transform of W, i.e. the cost of gambling depends only
on the preference value of the lottery and not on other characteristics. Further,
the risky and riskless functionals order outcomes in the same manner, and W is
assumed to be an expected utility functional. These assumptions also underlie
the representations in Fishburn’s Theorems 1 and 2 (called “fragmented” by him,
p. 441) and in his other theorems. Under these assumptions, Fishburn’s model
can be rewritten as a special case of the second approach with C depending on the
outcome x. It is a special case because both W and W −C represent preferences
over risky lotteries, implying that v and u order outcomes in the same manner.3
The second approach, with C depending only on x, was suggested by Fishburn
(1980) and Tversky (1967) and was formalized by Schmidt (1998), a work written
independently of Fishburn (1980). Schmidt used the term certainty eﬀect instead
of our general term gambling eﬀect. He assumed a separable metric outcome
space and imposed continuity and boundedness conditions. Thus, his work does
not provide a genuine generalization of the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected
3In the notation of Fishburn’s Theorem 3, both u and u + φ order preferences over risky
lotteries. We can therefore deﬁne a strictly increasing transformation f such that f(u+φ)=u.
Applying f to Fishburn’s representation u + φ yields the expected utility representation for
lotteries, and for outcomes x, f transforms (u + φ) into what we call v.44 3.4. Related Literature
utility model. Our axiomatization generalizes Schmidt’s by permitting general
outcomes as did Fishburn. In that manner, we obtain a genuine generalization
of the von Neumann-Morgenstern model that deviates as little as possible while
accommodating the Allais paradox.
Luce & Marley (2000) consider decision under uncertainty instead of risk. Un-
certainty is described through events for which no probabilities need to be given.
Their model can be considered a special case of the ﬁrst approach to Eq. 3.1
with the cost C(x,P) depending on P only through the uncertain events used to
describe P and not through the outcomes (with their kernel equivalent playing
t h er o l eo fo u rW). Their approach deviates from the common decision paradigm
in several respects.4
We next discuss some works that formulated versions of the gambling eﬀect but
did not provide preference axioms. Tversky (1967) explicitly pointed out that
discrepancies between risky and riskless utilities can be aﬀected by the gambling
eﬀect. He considered single nonzero outcomes and the logarithm of von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility. Nonlinear probability weighting was permitted. Tversky did
not elaborate on his interpretations and experimental measurements formally, and
did not explicate their similarities and diﬀerences with Savage’s (1954) expected
utility versus Edwards’ (1962) risk model. Hence, his model is not discussed
further.
Conlisk (1993) considered the ﬁrst approach (C depending on P), for two-outcome
gambles with expectation zero. He assumed that C is negative (so gambling is
valued positively) but remains small, so that it can aﬀect gambles for small out-
comes but not for large outcomes. This model could explain risk seeking for small-
outcome gambles. Empirical evidence was presented. Conlisk derived plausible
implications from assumptions such as concavity on C and the other functions.
Note that the Allais paradox cannot be explained by Conlisk’s model because
C is negative (Conlisk 1993 end of Section 5). His section 5 also demonstrates
that decreasing proportional risk aversion, often observed empirically, may be
explained by a gambling eﬀect.
Neilson (1992) and Humphrey (1998) considered models where for each nat-
4E.g., they use joint receipts meaning that more than one act is received simultaneously,
they consider multistage gambles, and acts are not identiﬁed with mappings from states to
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ural number n a utility function un is given. Gambles with exactly n positive-
probability outcomes are evaluated by expected utility with respect to un.T h e y
gave empirical evidence supporting such models. The gambling eﬀect model
studied in the present paper can be considered the special case of the Neilson-
Humphrey model where only u1 deviates from the other utilities and all ujsf o r
j ≥ 2 are identical. This special case does cover the main cause of boundary
eﬀects, i.e. the certainty eﬀect. Our paper can therefore be interpreted as a study
of the simplest case of the Neilson-Humphrey model.
Another general model is presented by Le Menestrel (1999), where the evaluation
of a gamble can depend on the process generating the gamble. Le Menestrel shows
that the gambling eﬀect is a special case of his general model and demonstrates
that this special case can have empirical implications.
For health outcomes, Richardson (1994) considered two-outcome gambles and
assumed that C consists of a constant utility of gambling plus a term depending
o nt h es u r eo u t c o m ex. Other references from health economics are Bombardier
et al. (1982), Gafni & Torrance (1984), Loomes (1993), Stiggelbout et al. (1994).
In the health domain, Gafni and colleagues argued for a systematic diﬀerence
between risky and riskless options (Gafni & Birch 1997, Mehrez & Gafni 1989).
Their theoretical derivations, unfortunately, turned out to be incorrect (Johan-
nesson, Pliskin, & Weinstein 1993, Wakker 1996). The intuition underlying their
approach is valuable and the present paper may help formalize it.
3.5 Theory
This section provides the theoretical background for the claims made in this
paper. In particular, a preference foundation is provided, demonstrating how
the model can be tested through observed choices. As is common in discussions
of the gambling eﬀect, we restrict attention to decision under risk with given
probabilities. We therefore use the term lottery instead of the term gamble.
A lottery (p1,x 1;...;pn,x n) yields outcome xj with probability pj, j =1 ,...,n.
Probabilities are nonnegative and sum to one. C denotes the set of all conceivable
outcomes and L the set of all lotteries. We do not impose any condition on C
and it can be any arbitrary set, such as health states, commodity bundles, or
monetary rewards. L contains all ﬁnite probability distributions over C.T h a ti s ,46 3.5. Theory
every lottery is assumed to take only ﬁnitely many outcomes. Any lottery can be
written as (p1,x 1;...;pn,x n) for a ﬁnite n. Preferences over lotteries are denoted
by <,w i t hÂ (strict preference) and ∼ (indiﬀerence) as usual.
Throughout, any outcome x is identiﬁed with the corresponding riskless lottery
(1,x). The set of all riskless (Safe) lotteries is identiﬁed with the outcome set
C. The set of the remaining, risky,l o t t e r i e s ,L − S, is denoted by R.T h i ss e t
contains all lotteries (p1,x 1;...;pn,x n) with n ≥ 2 and xi 6= xj for some i,j
with pi > 0 and pj > 0.A nevaluation or representation V i saf u n c t i o no nt h e
lotteries that determines preference, i.e. P < Q if and only if V (P) ≥ V (Q).
Deﬁnition 3.1 T h eg a m b l i n ge ﬀect model holds if there exists a utility function
u : C → IR, a cost function c : C → IR,av a l u ef u n c t i o nv = u − c,a n da n
evaluation V that assigns to each risky lottery (p1,x 1;...;pn,x n) its u expectation
p1u(x1)+···+ pnu(xn),a n dv(x) to each outcome x. ¤
At this moment we do not yet impose any restriction on the relations between
v and u. These functions may order riskless outcomes diﬀerently. This issue is
further discussed in the following section. We study preference conditions for
the above model. Weak ordering means that < is complete (P < Q or Q < P
for all lotteries P,Q) and transitive. For the independence condition we consider
mixtures of lotteries. For lotteries P and Q and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, λP +( 1− λ)Q is
the lottery assigning probability λP(x)+( 1− λ)Q(x) to each outcome x.H e r e
P and Q can be risky or riskless. The main weakening of expected utility is that
independence is now imposed only on the risky lotteries, as in Fishburn (1980)
and Schmidt (1998).
Deﬁnition 3.2 Gambling independence holds if
P Â Q implies λP +( 1− λ)R Â λQ +( 1− λ)R
for all risky P,Q,R and 0 <λ<1. ¤
This axiom provides the most straightforward modiﬁcation of expected utility to
accommodate the Allais paradox. One simply adheres to expected utility except
when the certainty eﬀect can play a role. Burks (1977, p. 307/308) suggested this3. The Gambling Eﬀect Reconsidered 47
approach as normative. He favored satisfying expected utility except in choice
situations like Allais’ paradox, where he preferred deviating from expected utility.
His viewpoint is similar to the model characterized next. Observation 3.7 will
demonstrate that Burks’ approach faces its own normative problems.
To obtain real-valued evaluations, Archimedean axioms have to be imposed.
These are usually somewhat complex and are technical, i.e. have no direct empiri-
cal content. In our model the Archimedean axiom is more complicated than under
expected utility because the riskless lotteries have to be treated separately. Our
axiom generalizes Fishburn’s (1980) Archimedean axioms. In Schmidt (1998),
the Archimedean axiom is implied by topological assumptions. Condition (i) in
Deﬁnition 3.3 restricts the traditional Archimedean axiom of expected utility to
t h ec a s eo fr i s k yP,R so as to mix only risky lotteries. It covers the regular out-
comes, i.e. outcomes that are not superior or inferior to all lotteries. Additional
conditions have to be formulated for the nonregular outcomes that are preferred
more or less than all lotteries. These conditions are speciﬁed in (ii) and (iii).
Deﬁnition 3.3 The Archimedean Axiom holds if:
(i) For all lotteries Q and risky lotteries P, R,i fP Â Q Â R then λR +( 1−
λ)P Â Q and Q Â µP +( 1− µ)R for some 0 <λ<1 and 0 <µ<1.
(ii) If, for some outcome x, x Â S (x ≺ S) for all risky lotteries S,t h e nµ (λ)
in Statement (i) can be chosen independently of P (Q).
(iii) There exists a countable subset D of outcomes that is order-dense in the
sense that, for every preference x Â y, x < d < y for some d ∈ D.
¤
It follows from substitution that all conditions formulated above are necessary
for the gambling eﬀect model. They are also suﬃcient, as the following theorem
shows.
Theorem 3.4 Let < be a preference relation on the set L of all ﬁnite probability
distributions over a set C. Then preferences are evaluated by a gambling eﬀect
model if and only if < satisﬁes (i) weak ordering, (ii) gambling independence,
and (iii) the Archimedean axiom. ¤48 3.6. Stochastic Dominance
The uniqueness in the theorem is standard but its formulation is complex due to
the diﬀerent functions and their interactions. In short, u is unique up to scale
a n dl o c a t i o na n dv shares the same scale and location except for outcomes that
are preferred more or less than all lotteries. For the latter, v is ordinal.
Observation 3.5 The uniqueness results for Theorem 3.4 are as follows. As-
suming that u is replaced by another function u∗,w eh a v e :
(i) There exist a real τ and a positive σ such that u∗ = τ +σ ×u (u is unique
up to scale and location).
(ii) Given τ and σ as in (i), v is replaced by v∗ = τ + σ × v for all outcomes
indiﬀerent to some lottery.
(iii) If outcomes exist that are preferred to all lotteries then v is ordinal there,
i.e.,
it can be replaced by v∗ if and only if v∗ exceeds all expectations of u∗ and
further v∗ is a strictly increasing transform of v.}
(iv) If outcomes exist that are dispreferred to all lotteries then v is ordinal there,
i . e . ,i tc a nb er e p l a c e db yv∗ if and only if v∗ is exceeded by all expectations
of u∗ and further v∗ is a strictly increasing transform of v.
(v) c∗is deﬁned accordingly, as v∗ − u∗.
¤
It is remarkable that, outside the outcomes preferred more than all lotteries
or less than all lotteries, v is also cardinal (unique up to scale and location).
Consequently, diminishing marginal value can be deﬁned and empirically veriﬁed
without even resorting to ﬁrst-order diﬀerence measurements (Basu 1982, Lange
1934, Samuelson 1938). It can be distinguished from diminishing marginal utility
in terms of u.
3.6 Stochastic Dominance
The analysis in the preceding section did not impose any restriction on the re-
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outcomes in the same manner. This is called ordinal equivalence and is formally
deﬁned as u(x) ≥ u(y) if and only if v(x) ≥ v(y). It is well-known that ordinal
equivalence holds if and only if u(x)=f(v(x)) for a strictly increasing function f.
The condition is natural for monetary outcomes, with higher amounts preferred
to lower amounts both under v and u, and was assumed by Fishburn (1980). For
general outcomes, e.g., multiattribute outcomes or commodity bundles, the con-
dition is not self-evident because the tradeoﬀs made between commodities may
be diﬀerent under risk than under certainty.
An example from health economics is as follows. Assume a two-attribute setting
of chronic health states. One dimension designates duration, the other state of
health. Assume that x =( 2 5 ,B), designating 25 years of life while being blind,
f o l l o w e db yd e a t h .I nt h etime tradeoﬀ method for measuring value, introduced
by Torrance, Thomas, & Sackett (1972), subjects are asked how many years of
life they would be willing to sacriﬁce, hypothetically, to obtain full health. Say
the subject says ﬁve years, meaning that x ∼ y with y =( 2 0 ,H),2 0y e a r si n
perfect health followed by death. The subject may use an ordinally diﬀerent
evaluation system for risky decisions. Due to the gambling eﬀect, a medical
treatment that with some probability results in (25,B) need not be indiﬀerent to
another treatment that results in the same probability distribution with, however,
outcome (25,B) replaced by outcome (20,H). Such phenomena are well-known
in health economics and have led Gafni and colleagues to develop the healthy
years equivalent method.
In the absence of ordinal equivalence, there is no natural way to impose or
even deﬁne stochastic dominance. We now turn to a preference condition that
does ensure ordinal equivalence and next discuss stochastic dominance. Gamble
monotonicity holds if replacement of an outcome by a preferred outcome always
leads to a preferred lottery, assuming that both lotteries are risky. Formally, for
all 0 <λ<1 and for all outcomes x,y and risky lotteries P, x < y if and only if
λx +( 1− λ)P < λy +( 1− λ)P. Note the restriction to risky lotteries P,w h i c h
serves to avoid confounding with the gambling eﬀect.
Observation 3.6 Assume the gambling eﬀect model. Ordinal equivalence of u
and v holds if and only if gamble monotonicity holds. ¤
Under ordinal equivalence, the riskless ordering of outcomes is relevant to risky50 3.7. Measuring Risk Attitudes
choice, and stochastic dominance becomes meaningful. In our model, it is triv-
ially satisﬁed for risky lotteries because there expected utility holds. For riskless
lotteries, however, the condition becomes nontrivial due to the gambling eﬀect.
The formulation of the condition chosen here highlights the relations and diﬀer-
ences with ordinal equivalence. Let us emphasize that the following formulation
of stochastic dominance is logically equivalent, on our domain L of ﬁnite proba-
bility distributions, to traditional formulations in terms of pointwise dominance
of distribution functions.
Stochastic dominance holds if, for all outcomes x,y, 0 <λ<1, and lotteries P,
x < y implies λx +( 1− λ)P < λy +( 1− λ)P. The main diﬀerence with gamble
monotonicity is that now all P are permitted, also riskless P.F o rP = x or P = y
interaction with the gambling eﬀect arises. It will turn out that the condition
in fact excludes any gambling eﬀect and reduces the model to expected utility.
This was demonstrated for monetary outcomes and continuous nondecreasing u
by Schmidt (1998, Proposition 1). We demonstrate the result in general.
Observation 3.7 Under the gambling eﬀect model, stochastic dominance holds
if and only if expected utility is satisﬁed (i.e. v = u can be chosen). ¤
Assuming that stochastic dominance is normatively desirable, the result shows
that the gambling eﬀect model is not normative. Under that assumption, the
interest of the model is descriptive and lies in its psychological plausibility. A
n o r m a t i v ei n t e r e s tc a na r i s ei ft h e r ea r ee x o g e n o u sr e a s o n sf o rd i ﬀerent evalua-
tions of risky and riskless outcomes, e.g. in cases of asymmetric information or
transaction costs.
3.7 Measuring Risk Attitudes
This section assumes the gambling eﬀect model. We discuss the empirical mea-
surement of the primitives and some restrictions.
Eliciting u and v from preferences. In the trivial case where all risky lotteries
are indiﬀerent, u is constant. We assume henceforth that not all lotteries are
indiﬀerent so that u is not constant. We take two arbitrary outcomes M and m
such that u(M) >u (m) and normalize u(M)=1and u(m)=0 . For instance,3. The Gambling Eﬀect Reconsidered 51
M may be a maximally and m a minimally conceivable monetary reward, or, in
the health domain, M may be perfect health and m immediate death. Here are
some ways of measuring u.


























u(x)=µ>1 if x 6= m and (1
2,M; 1
2,m) ∼ ( 1
2µ,x;1− 1
2µ,m).
u(x)=µ<0 if x 6= M and (1
2,M; 1
2,m) ∼ (1 − 1
2−2µ,M; 1
2−2µ,x).
Obviously, these are all methods for measuring traditional von Neumann-Morgens
tern utility functions without invoking riskless options. McCord & de Neufville
(1986) argued for such measurements, precisely to avoid the certainty eﬀect.
Before, Davidson & Suppes (1956, p. 266), Davidson, Suppes, & Siegel (1957, p.
18), and Oﬃcer & Halter (1968, bottom of p. 259, p. 272) also argued for such
measurements with the explicit purpose to avoid or reduce distortions due to a
speciﬁc taste or distaste for gambling; thus, better results were obtained. Dybvig
& Polemarchakis (1981) present a measurement method for incomplete markets
in which riskless gambles are essential, but they suggest alternative ways to avoid
riskless gambles (p. 160). The gambling eﬀect model provides a formal support
for measurements that avoid riskless lotteries. Next we turn to the measurement
of v.I fx ∼ P for a risky lottery P with expected utility µ,t h e nv(x)=µ.W e
therefore get:
If u(M) >v (x) >u (m),t h e nw ec a nﬁnd v(x)=µ from a traditional standard
gamble indiﬀerence x ∼ (µ,M;1− µ,m).
If there are outcomes x that are strictly preferred to each lottery, then u is
bounded (see the proof of Theorem 3.4 in the appendix). On this set of strictly
preferred outcomes x, the function v is only ordinally determined as long as it
exceeds all u values. Similarly, for outcomes x preferred strictly less than all risky
lotteries, v is ordinally determined as long as it is below all u values.
A useful feature, distinguishing the gambling eﬀect model from other models52 3.7. Measuring Risk Attitudes
separating between risky and riskless utility, is that v can be directly revealed
from risky choices, that is, from indiﬀerences between risky and riskless options.
It has been found empirically that measurements comparing risky to riskless
options yield more concave utility functions than measurements that invoke only
risky options (McCord & de Neufville 1986, Wakker & Deneﬀe 1996). That may
partly be due to the gambling eﬀect, i.e. to an intrinsic cost of risk.
Constant gambling eﬀect. The utility measurements can reveal special properties
of u and v, and can be used to characterize them. One special case of interest
concerns a constant cost function c. In the health domain, this case is discussed
by Richardson (1994). There is a ﬁxed cost c f o rr e s o r t i n gt or i s ka t t i t u d ea n d
this cost is incurred whenever risk is perceived. The cost is independent of what
the precise risk is. Riskless outcomes x are valued by v(x), risky lotteries are
evaluated by the expected utility of the function u(x)=v(x) − c. The utility
measurement techniques, described in the preceding section, can reveal such a
constant cost function.
Alternatively, the case can be identiﬁed through direct preference conditions.
This was done by Fishburn (1980, Theorem 4). We adapt his condition to our
context. First assume that x ∼ P and y ∼ Q for outcomes x,y and risky lotteries




2P. Both mixtures are risky and,
hence, are evaluated by expected utility. It can be seen that the evaluation of
each comprises half times: v(x) plus v(y) plus the cost c. The mixtures therefore
must be indiﬀerent. This analysis leads to the following characterization, where
we assume an indiﬀerence to avoid triviality and some pathological cases.
Theorem 3.8 Assume the gambling eﬀect model and assume that y ∼ Q for an
outcome y and a risky lottery Q. Then the cost function c = v − u is constant if
and only if the following conditions hold (hereafter, x and y are outcomes and P
and Q are risky lotteries).
(i) Gamble monotonicity.
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Intransitivity instead of violation of stochastic dominance. Imagine a choice be-
tween a sure outcome x and a risky lottery P,s u c ht h a te a c ho u t c o m eo fP
is strictly preferred to x, but the gambling eﬀect model assigns a higher value
to x. As shown in Observation 3.7, such violations of stochastic dominance or
reversed violations with a preference for a dominated gamble, exist. Will a sub-
j e c t ,d i r e c t l yh a v i n gt oc h o o s ef r o mt h e s et w oo p t i o n s ,r e a l l yf o r e g oal o t t e r yt h a t
can only bring better outcomes? The answer depends on the context. Many
violations of stochastic dominance concern framings of problems in which the
stochastic dominance does not come out clearly and subjects do not realize it.
Another reason for the gambling eﬀect can lie in transaction costs; examples were
given in Section 3.3. Alternatively, the subject may want to lay down his future
plans and then forget about it, and simply does not even want to think about
possible future proﬁts if they are uncertain and small. Whenever there are such
concrete reasons underlying the cost function, it seems plausible that indeed the
sure outcome x is chosen and stochastic dominance, deﬁned in a narrow sense, is
violated.
T h ec a s ei sd i ﬀerent when the gambling eﬀect is due to irrationalities and sim-
plistic decision heuristics. When there is a clear dominance, it is plausible that
subjects go by that dominance and their behavior is not described by the gam-
bling eﬀect model. Only if there is no clear dominance then subjects’ behavior is
described by the gambling eﬀect model. Subjects may prefer x to some lottery Q
and Q to P whereas P dominates x. Such editing (Kahneman & Tversky 1979)
entails violations of transitivity but constitutes an empirically plausible variation
of the gambling eﬀect model.
Certainty Preference. An interesting special case is the case where c(x) ≥ 0 for
all outcomes x, i.e. the cost of gambling is always nonnegative and there is a
preference for certainty. Schmidt (1998) characterized this special case by the
following preference condition:
For all risky lotteries P,Q,o u t c o m e sx,a n d0 <λ<1,i fλx +( 1− λ)Q ∼
λP +( 1− λ)Q,t h e nx < P.54 3.8. Conclusion
The proof that this condition is necessary and suﬃcient for nonnegative costs
of gambling follows from substitution and is not elaborated here (Schmidt 1998,
Corollary 2).
3.8 Conclusion
Throughout the history of risky choice, researchers have been aware of the gam-
bling eﬀect, entailing that people use a diﬀerent method for evaluating riskless
options than for evaluating risky options. Theoretical models for the eﬀect are
almost absent, probably due to the holistic nature of the gambling eﬀect and the
belonging violation of stochastic dominance. Only recently, economists have de-
veloped an interest in basic violations of rationality conditions such as stochastic
dominance.
The model studied in this paper provides a tractable theoretical basis for the
gambling eﬀect and describes the most eﬃcient deviation from expected utility
to explain the Allais paradox that is presently known. Tractable methods for the
measurement of its primitives have been presented, in particular for measuring
riskless utility at a cardinal level. The model sheds new light on risk aversion
and its applications to gambling, insurance, and other contexts. It seems plau-
sible that many investigations into risk attitudes have been confounded by the
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 3.4 and Observation 3.5.W eﬁr s ta s s u m et h eg a m b l i n g
eﬀect model and derive the preference conditions. Weak ordering is immediate,
and gambling independence follows from the expected utility representation on R.
We ﬁnally demonstrate the Archimedean axiom. Part (i) follows from linearity of
expected utility on R and by taking λ and µ suﬃciently small. Part (iii) follows
because < has a real-valued representation, v,o nC (Fishburn 1970, Theorem
3.1). Finally, we turn to part (ii). If, for some outcome x, x Â S for all risky
lotteries S,t h e nv(x) provides an upper bound for u, implying that µ in (i) can
be chosen independently from P.T h ec a s eo fa nx inferior to all risky lotteries
is treated similarly, now with v(x) a lower bound for u. All preference conditions
have been satisﬁed.
We next assume the preference conditions and derive the gambling eﬀect model.
On R all preference axioms of expected utility are satisﬁed and, hence, an ex-
pected utility representation can be obtained there, with the utility function de-
noted u.T h i si sp r o v e db yF i s h b u r n( 1 9 8 0 ,p .4 3 8 ) .W eb r i e ﬂys k e t c ht h ep r o o f .
R is a mixture set on which weak ordering, independence, and the appropriate
Archimedean axiom (our Part (i) only for risky Q) imply a linear representation
by Fishburn (1970, Theorem 8.4). Although no outcomes are contained in R,
it is still possible to deﬁne u on the outcomes such that the linear functional
is expected utility with respect to u.E . g . , u(y)=λu(x)+( 1− λ)u(z) can be





2 z for any risky lottery
P. The results of Fishburn (1980 p. 438) as well as the indiﬀerence just written
imply that u is unique up to scale and location.
Outcomes x such that x Â P for all P ∈R are called superior outcomes, outcomes
x such that x ≺ P for all P ∈R are called inferior outcomes. We ﬁrst extend the
evaluation to outcomes that are neither superior nor inferior. For these outcomes,
there exist risky lotteries P,Q such that P < x < Q.I tc a nb ed e r i v e df r o m( i )o f
the Archimedean axiom that there exists a risky lottery R indiﬀerent to x.T h i s
reasoning is similar to Fishburn (1970, C2 in Theorem 8.3). In short, if neither
P nor Q can play the role of R, then it follows from gambling independence that
{λ∈[0,1] : λP +(1−λ)Q Â x} is convex, and from (i) of the Archimedean axiom
that it is of the form (µ,1] for some µ. Similarly, {λ∈[0,1] : λP +(1−λ)Q ≺ x}
is of the form [0,ν) for some ν. It then follows that R = µP +( 1− µ)Q can be56 Appendix
taken (it can also be seen that µ = ν). We deﬁne v(x) as the expected utility of
R. T h i si st h eo n l yd e ﬁnition of v possible, given u. We have now established
the gambling eﬀect model, and its uniqueness, on the union of all risky lotteries
and all outcomes that are neither inferior nor superior.
Next we consider superior and inferior outcomes. Let there exist a superior
outcome x.T h e n u must be bounded above, due to (ii) of the Archimedean
axiom. To wit, assume that u is not constant. Then we can take two risky
lotteries Q,R with Q Â R. Assume there is a risky P with P Â Q,i fs u c hP does
not exist then u is bounded and we are done. Take µ as in (ii) of the Archimedean
axiom. Writing EU for expected utility, it follows that µEU(P) <E U (Q) −
(1 − µ)EU(R) which provides an upper bound to EU(P) and thus u must be
bounded from above. Similarly, if there exist inferior outcomes, then u must
be bounded from below. By part (iii) of the Archimedean axiom and Fishburn
(1970, Theorem 3.1), there exists a function v∗ on C that represents < on C.O n
the superior outcomes, we must and can let v be any ordinal transform of v∗ that
exceeds the upper bound of u,o nt h ei n f e r i o ro u t c o m e sw em u s ta n dc a nl e tv be
any ordinal transform of v∗ that is below the lower bound of u. This establishes
the gambling eﬀect model and also the uniqueness results of Observation 3.5. ¤
P r o o fo fO b s e r v a t i o n3 . 6 .
First assume ordinal equivalence of u and v. Assume that we replace a positive-
probability outcome in a lottery by a strictly preferred outcome in such a manner
that the lottery is risky both before and after the substitution. It means that
we have replaced the outcome by one with a strictly higher v value and, hence,
by ordinal equivalence, by one with a strictly higher u value. Given positiveness
of the probability, the replacement strictly increases the expected utility of the
lottery, therefore also its preference value. A similar reasoning applies if we
replace an outcome by an indiﬀerent outcome, or by an outcome preferred strictly
less. From this and weak ordering, gamble monotonicity follows.
Next assume that gamble monotonicity holds. Consider two outcomes x,y with
v(x) >v (y). This implies x Â y.L e t P be any risky lottery. By gamble
monotonicity, 0.5x+0.5P Â 0.5y+0.5P. Substitution of expected utility implies
u(x) >u (y). Similarly, v(x)=v(y) implies u(x)=u(y) and v(x) <v (y)
implies u(x) <u (y).T h a t i s ,v and u are ordinally equivalent. Notice that we
used gamble monotonicity only with λ =0 .5 in this step. It would therefore3. The Gambling Eﬀect Reconsidered 57
have suﬃced to require the condition only for that λ. This was actually the
formulation used by Fishburn (1980, Axiom A2a). ¤
P r o o fo fO b s e r v a t i o n3 . 7 .
It is obvious that expected utility implies stochastic dominance. Hence, we as-
sume stochastic dominance and the gambling eﬀect model, and derive expected
utility.
Claim 1. If for outcome x, there exists an outcome y Â x,t h e nv(x) ≤ u(x).
Proof. Consider a lottery (p,y;1− p,x). By stochastic dominance, the lottery
is preferred to x and, hence, its expected utility exceeds v(x).F o rp tending to
zero, the expected utility tends to u(x), therefore u(x) exceeds v(x). QED
Similarly it can be demonstrated that:
Claim 2. If for outcome x, there exists an outcome y ≺ x,t h e nv(x) ≥ u(x).
The two claims show that u(x)=v(x) for all outcomes x, except best or worst
outcomes. Consider now a best outcome x. To avoid triviality we assume two
nonindiﬀerent outcomes. Hence, by Claim 2, v(x) ≥ u(x).I fv(x) >u (x),t h e n
we can simply redeﬁne v(x)=u(x) and v(y)=u(y) for all outcomes y ∼ x.
This deﬁnition leads to correct descriptions of all preferences with x involved.
We have strict preference and strictly higher value for x than for each lottery
assigning positive probability to any outcome strictly worse than x.W e h a v e
indiﬀerence and equal value for x and each lottery assigning probability 1 to
outcomes indiﬀerent to x. Similarly, for a worst outcome y we can redeﬁne
v(y)=u(y). ¤
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m3 . 8 .
Some explanation was already given above the theorem. Necessity of the prefer-
ence conditions follows from substitution. For suﬃciency, assume the preference
conditions. Take y as assumed in the theorem. Deﬁne γ = c(y).O n t h es e to f
nonsuperior and noninferior outcomes x, c(x)=γ follows from condition (ii) and
substitution. Deﬁne v∗ = u + γ, also for superior and inferior outcomes.58 Appendix
If x is superior then condition (iii) ensures that v(x) >E U(P) for all lotteries. If
x is inferior then condition (iv) ensures that v(x) <E U(P) for all lotteries. Now
the representation accommodates all preferences. ¤
The gambling effect model with a linear cost of gambling. In the
main body of the paper, we assumed the special case of Eq. 3.1 with C depending
only on the sure outcome x. This assumption can be rewritten as a special case
of dependency of C on the lottery P, given the assumption throughout that W is
expected utility. To this end, let W∗ be expected utility with respect to v instead
of u, and for each lottery P deﬁne C∗(P) as the expectation of v−u.W i t ht h e s e
substitutions, W∗(x)=v(x) for all x and W∗(P) − C∗(P)=W(P) for all P,s o
that the representation is identical to the original one. Conversely, every case of
Eq. 3.1 with C depending on P in a linear manner can, by inverse substitutions,
b ec a r r i e di n t oac a s eo fE q .3 . 1w i t hc o s t sd e p e n d i n go n l yo nx. Therefore, the
second approach in Section 3.2 can be considered as a special case of the ﬁrst
approach. ¤3. The Gambling Eﬀect Reconsidered 59
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A Test of Decision Weights for
Three-Outcome Gambles
4.1 Introduction
Rank-dependence, incorporated in the modern version of prospect theory (Tver-
sky & Kahneman 1992), assumes that the decision weights of events depend on
the ranking position of these events as regards the favorableness of their outcomes.
T h ee m p i r i c a lp e r f o r m a n c eo ft h et h e o r yh a sb e e nr e a s o n a b l ef o rt w o - o u t c o m e
gambles. For three outcomes, there are no clear results, and several papers have
reported negative ﬁndings (Birnbaum & McIntosh 1996, Birnbaum & Navarrete
1998, Fennema & Wakker 1996, Wakker, Erev, & Weber 1994, Wu 1994). Pos-
itive results are in Wu & Gonzalez (1999). Weber & Kirsner (1997) also found
rank-dependence, but it was the explicit purpose of this study to generate rank-
dependence by framing techniques such as highlighting best or worst outcomes,
printing them in larger sizes, etc. Gonzalez & Wu (in preparation) report re-
sults that are between original prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) and
rank-dependence.
Birnbaum, Coﬀey, Mellers, & Weiss (1992) demonstrated that the zero outcome
induces several biases in the evaluation of gambles. We will therefore investigate
0The results in this chapter were ﬁrst formulated in Diecidue, Enrico, Peter P. Wakker, &
Marcel Zeelenberg (2001), “A Test of Decision Weights for Three-Outcome Gambles.” CentER,
Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands.
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the empirical performance of rank-dependence for three-outcome gambles with-
out zero outcomes. Empirical works have investigated the shape of the weighting
function, and studies are still going on (Abdellaoui 2000, Bleichrodt & Pinto
2000, Gonzalez & Wu 1999, Loehman 1998, Tversky & Kahneman 1992). Many
observed weighting functions are concave for unlikely events and convex for mod-
erate and likely events. This pattern is called bounded subadditivity or, in infor-
mal terms, inverse-S.I ti m p l i e st h a tp a r t i c i p a n t sp a ym u c ha t t e n t i o nt ob e s ta n d
worst outcomes, and little attention to intermediate outcomes. The inverse-S
shape predicts that people are optimistic and, hence, risk seeking for gambles
that yield gains with small likelihood such as found in public lotteries. People
are pessimistic and, hence, risk averse for gambles that yield losses with small
likelihood, which is relevant to insurance. The simultaneous existence of gam-
bling and insurance, a classical paradox in economics, can therefore be explained
by the inverse-S pattern.
In the present study, we are interested in decision weights in an uncertainty set-
up, i.e. without the presence of known probabilities. Although it is rare to have
known probabilities in reality, most of the experiments that have been carried
out are in the domain of risk, i.e. with probability attached to outcomes. Most
of the time, the decision maker faces a decision where outcomes do not have
attached probabilities, but depend on events with unknown probabilities. Under
uncertainty, rank-dependent utility is often called Choquet expected utility. We
will, however, use the generic term rank-dependent utility also for uncertainty in
this chapter.
We consider outcomes ranging between Dﬂ. 10 (approximately $4) and Dﬂ.9 9 ,
that is, we consider moderate amounts of money. Several papers have argued
that utility is approximately linear for moderate outcomes (Edwards 1955, Fox,
Rogers, & Tversky 1996, Lopes & Oden 1999 p. 290, Luce 2000 p. 86, Ram-
sey 1931 p. 176, Rabin 2000, Savage 1954 p. 91). An axiomatization of rank-
dependent utility with linear utility can be found in Chateauneuf (1991) and
Diecidue & Wakker (2001).4. A Test of Decision Weights for Three-Outcome Gambles 67
4.2 Theory and Hypotheses
We consider uncertainty generated by the performance of the Dow Jones and the
Nikkei indexes on the day of the experiment, with the event U (indicated by ↑↑ in
Figure 1) designating the event that both indexes will go Up, D (indicated by ↓↓
in Figure 1) the event that both indexes will go Down, and R the rest-event, i.e.
one or both remain constant or one goes up and the other goes down (indicated
by ↑↓= in Figure 1). These events and their likelihoods obviously depend on the
day of the experiment, and were diﬀerent for students who took the experiment
on diﬀerent days. Figure 1 illustrates a typical choice situation in our experiment.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
The grey, middle, column in Figure 1 designates a gamble yielding Dﬂ.4 4i fU,
Dﬂ.2 9i fD,a n dD ﬂ.1 3i fR. This gamble is called the reference gamble.T h el e f t
column, indicated by a single large-size plus, designates a gamble yielding Dﬂ.
20 more than the reference gamble if U, and the same as the reference gamble
otherwise. The right column, indicated by three small plusses, indicates a gamble
yielding Dﬂ. 3 more than the reference gamble in each event. Participants were
a s k e dt oc h o o s eb e t w e e nt h el e f ta n dr i g h tg a m b l e sa n di n d i c a t et h e i rc h o i c e si n
the boxes below the ﬁgure.
We assume rank-dependent utility with linear utility, which is deﬁned as follows.
T h ev a l u eo ft h el e f tg a m b l ei nF i g u r e1i s
π
b
U × 64 + π
m,U
D × 29 + π
w
R × 13 (4.1)
where the π’s are decision weights. They are nonnegative and sum to one. πb
U
designates the decision weight of the event U when it yields the best outcome.68 4.2. Theory and Hypotheses
π
m,U
D is the decision weight of event D when it yields the middle (second-best)
outcome, with event U yielding the best outcome. πw
R is the decision weight of
event R when it yields the worst outcome. Because the reference gamble and
the right gamble generate the same rank-ordering of outcomes, the same decision




D ,a r ed e ﬁned similarly and are used in evaluations of other gambles.
For instance, the gamble yielding Dﬂ.1 6i fU,D ﬂ.6 1i fD,a n dD ﬂ.4 7i fR is
evaluated by πw
U × 16 + πb
D × 61 + π
m,D
R × 47.
Rank-dependent utility predicts that the decision weight that a participant as-
signs to an event depends not only on its perceived likelihood, but also on the
relative goodness of the associated outcome. For example, πw
D, π
m,R
D ,a n dπb
D,
decision weights of event D in diﬀerent ranking positions, may all be diﬀerent.
Our ﬁrst empirical hypothesis is therefore that these decision weights will depend
on the superscripts indicating their ranking position. We further investigate the
direction of dependency. Pessimism, often assumed in the literature, corresponds
to convex weighting functions. It entails that decision weights get higher as events
















are characteristic of pessimism. Similar inequalities hold for events U and R.
Optimism corresponds to concave weighting functions. It entails that decision








Bounded subadditivity, ﬁnally, assumes that extreme outcomes are overweighted










Bounded subadditive weighting functions are also called inverse-S.4. A Test of Decision Weights for Three-Outcome Gambles 69
4.3 Experiment
Participants. A total of 186 participants took part, all from Tilburg University.
One of every ten participants was selected to play one randomly selected choice
for real, and collect the money gained the next morning (when the relevant uncer-
tainties about the stock indexes had been resolved). There were 62 psychology
students who participated for course credits (in addition to the .10 chance of
playing a choice for real), divided into six groups. There also was a group of
124 students in general social sciences who participated in one big session. These
participants received a ﬂat payment of Dﬂ. 25 in addition to the chance of playing
a choice for real. The average age of the participants was 20.1, and 32.8% was
male.
Procedure. The experiment was carried out in classroom sessions. All items were
administered with paper-and-pencil questionnaires. The participants were asked
to ﬁll in the questionnaire at their own pace. This usually took about 45 minutes
(including the instructions).
Students received brief oral instructions, followed by a detailed written instruction
that took about 15 minutes to read. A transparency with a graph depicting the
performances of the stock indexes during the last two months, up to the day
of the experiment, was projected during the task. A brief text discussed the
likelihood of the stocks increasing or decreasing. As diﬀerent groups participated
on diﬀerent days, the information about the stocks varied from group to group.
Stimuli. After a test-choice in the instructions, there followed 22 pages each
containing 10 choice questions. The experiment started with two learning-task
pages, followed by 18 experimental-task pages and two ﬁller-question pages. The
ﬁller-question pages were always on the third and 10th place after the learning-
question pages. Other than that, the order of the experimental-question pages
was randomized. The randomization was generated through random permuta-
tions of 1,...,18, followed by manual reordering of the pages. In pilot studies, we
found that grouping the questions by events, and some other changes, induced
participants to resort to heuristics equivalent to expected value maximization (e.g.
by simply adding up outcomes), instead of expressing subjective preferences, and
therefore we avoided such procedures. The resort to expected-value heuristics
happened even more frequently if we used three symmetric events instead of the70 4.3. Experiment
events now chosen.
After the two learning-question pages and before the ﬁrst experimental-question
page, there were three questions about the diﬃculty of the questions and about
whether the participants paid attention to their perceived likelihoods of the
events. Each page contained 10 choice questions. The ﬁrst 10-tuple is presented
in Figure 2. The complete set of choice 10-tuples is summarized in Table 1.
Analysis. For each page, we measured where the participant switched from left
choices to right choices. Other choice patterns violate dominance and were coded
as missing values. Assuming that indiﬀerence is between the two choices where
preferences switch, and assuming linear utility, we could calculate the decision
weights. For example, if the switch on question 11 in Table 1 is at the seventh
table (k =7 ), then the decision weight is between 24/40 and 28/40.W et o o kt h e
middle of these values, i.e. in this case the decision weight is estimated as 26/40.
If the switch on question 15 is at the ﬁfth table (k =5 ), then the decision weight
is the middle of 8/20 and 10/20,t h u si ti s9/20.4. A Test of Decision Weights for Three-Outcome Gambles 71
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4.4 Experimental Results
For the event D, we measured the decision weight of the event when it was associ-
ated with the best outcome (πb
D), when it was associated with the worst outcome
(πw





The best and worst decision weights were measured in two diﬀerent contexts,




D , see questions 9 and 14 in Table




D , see questions 8 and 13 in Table 1). For
the other events U and R the weights are similarly deﬁned. This leads to six de-
cision weights per event and thus to 18 decision weights in total. Before turning
to the study of these separate decision weights, we ﬁrst consider overall estimates





















where the decision weights of the other events are deﬁned similarly. According








D ,s ot h a tπb
D
and πw





D may be diﬀerent, so that πw
D etc. are averages of two diﬀerent
decision weights. The means and the standard deviations of the averages are
depicted in Table 2. All tests in this paper are two-tailed t-tests.
INSERT Table 2 ABOUT HERE
These results do suggest an eﬀect of rank-dependence. For event U, there seems
to be some pessimism, because πb
U is less than πm
U (t165 = −4.18, p = .000)
and less than πw
U (t168 = −3.24, p = .001). Whereas pessimism suggests that
πm
U <π w
U, there is no diﬀerence in our data (t168 =0 .93, ns).74 4.4. Experimental Results
Event D exhibits an inverse-S pattern. That is, πb
D >π m
D (t168 =3 .35, p = .001)
and πw
D >π m
D (t169 =3 .12, p = .002) .T h e r ei sn os i g n i ﬁcant diﬀerence between
πb
D and πw
D (t168 =0 .13, ns).
Event R suggests optimism because πb
R >π w
R (t168 =2 .17, p = .03). The diﬀer-
ences between πb
R and πm
R (t169 =1 .36, ns)a n db e t w e e nπm
R and πw
R (t169 =1 .19,
ns)a r en o ts i g n i ﬁcant.
The results should be interpreted with caution. First, the forms of rank-dependence
vary and there is no clear pattern. Second, there may be confounding factors.
Table 1 gives the means and standard deviations of all the decision weights.













R . It is nevertheless plausible to conjec-
ture equalities between these pairs of weights. Indeed, none of these equalities
is rejected statistically (t170 = −.86, ns, t171 = −.05, ns,a n dt171 =1 .52, ns,
respectively).
Rank-dependence predicts that decision weights are the same if the ranking po-


























The six inequalities are listed in Table 3. The ﬁrst two equalities are rejected,
t h el a t t e rf o u ra r ea c c e p t e d .A p p a r e n t l ys o m eo t h e re ﬀects, deviating from rank-
dependent utility, are present for event U. A known confounding factor is whether
or not outcomes for diﬀerent events are identical, i.e. if they collapse.I no u re x -
periment, there are several cases of collapsing outcomes (questions 2, 7, 9, 14,
16, 20 in Table 1). In each of these cases a sure, riskless, gamble results, so that
the collapse eﬀect operates jointly with the certainty eﬀect in our design. The
certainty eﬀect entails that people additionally like riskless gambles. In our ex-
periment, the eﬀect can be expected to be less strong than in other experiments
because all outcomes are written separately, and collapsed outcomes are not taken





U , where participants seem to additionally value the sure
gambles (U,24 + 3k;D,24 + 3k;R,24 + 3k) in comparison to the risky gamble
(U,54;D,24;R,24), leading to a decreased decision weight for event U.T h ec e r -




U . Here participants
seem to additionally value the risky gambles (U,16 + 3k;D,46 + 3k;R,46 + 3k)4. A Test of Decision Weights for Three-Outcome Gambles 75
rather than the riskless gamble (U,46;D,46;R,46), leading to a decreased deci-
sion weight for event U. The other inequalities are not signiﬁcant, but suggest
as much tendency against the certainty eﬀect as in agreement with it.
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
Ar e s p o n s em o d ee ﬀect seems to be present in our data. Imagine a participant
who has a tendency to always switch preference in the middle of the ten-tuple
on each page. If the single increase in payment is small, say 20, and the general
increase for all outcomes is relatively large, say 3, then the eﬀect causes the
participant to switch too late so that our calculations give an overestimation of
the decision weight. Therefore, the tendency to switch preference at a ﬁxed place
in the ten-tuple of gambles leads to higher decision weights when the ratio of the
g e n e r a li n c r e a s ea n dt h es i n g l ei n c r e a s e is large, and to lower decision weights
otherwise. The ratios have been given in Table 3. (For middle-ranked events the
ratios were always the same, so that the eﬀect was never tested there.) In all
diﬀerences where it is tested, the eﬀect is conﬁrmed. Our data therefore suggest
that the certainty eﬀe c ta n dt h ec o l l a p s ee ﬀect are not strong, probably because
we did not collapse the outcomes in notation. Instead, they suggest a response
mode eﬀect of participants having some tendency to switch preference at the
same place in the ten-tuples.
Rank-dependence also predicts that decision weights for the same ranking of
events sum to one. We ﬁnd, however, that the weights sum to considerably more






























U = .5152 + .3138 + .4648 = 1.2938 > 1.
These results constitute deviations from subjective expected value maximization
and also from rank-dependent utility, in the direction of more risk seeking. Ap-
parently, our participants are more risk seeking than risk averse. The literature
so far has suggested that people are predominantly risk averse for lotteries with
known, not very small, probabilities and moderate gains, and that they become
more prudent and pessimistic if probabilities are unknown. Our data do not sup-
port these suggestions. Our participants have been predominantly risk seeking,
even though probabilities were unknown.
4.5 Discussion
The information that the participants received prior to their choices obviously in-
ﬂuenced their perceived likelihoods of the events and their choices. This similarly
holds for the location of the events in our stimuli, with always event U on top
of the table, event D in the middle, and event R down. It is important to note
that such inﬂuences do not aﬀect the research questions of this paper, namely
whether decision weights depend on rank-dependence and if so what the nature
of that dependency is. These phenomena should not be aﬀected systematically
by changes in the information and subjective likelihoods of the participants. We
therefore did not counterbalance for the location of the events in our stimuli.
In all pages, the payments are increasing with gambles becoming more favor-
able as they are more to the right. If the participants have a general tendency
to switch choice too late, then this tendency will distort our data and lead to
overestimations of decision weights. It is important to note that this distortion
does not aﬀect the central research questions of this paper, that is the presence
or absence of rank-dependence and the nature of such rank-dependence. This
distortion can aﬀect the question whether the decision weights add up to more4. A Test of Decision Weights for Three-Outcome Gambles 77
or less than 1. We therefore considered counterbalancing for this eﬀect. There
are, however, a number of drawbacks to such counterbalancing. In a reversed
presentation with payments decreasing as gambles are more to the right on the
page, several pages would start with choice situations governed by dominance for
o u rs t i m u l i( s e eq u e s t i o n s1 ,4 ,5 ,6 ,9 ,1 4i nT a b l e1 ) . W ef e l tt h a ts u c ht r i v -
ial opening questions on a page would generate amazement and distortions. We
therefore decided not to counterbalance for this eﬀect. An admitted drawback is
that we cannot exclude on empirical grounds that the decision weights summing
to more than one is enhanced by a general tendency of the participants to switch
choices too late. We ﬁnd it, however, implausible that such an eﬀect could be so
strong to give the overestimation of decision weights that we found.
We have assumed linear utility in our analysis. Had we assumed concave utility,
then the decision weights would in general have been higher, with convex util-
ity they would have been smaller. Again, the central research question, about
rank-dependence and its nature, would not have been systematically inﬂuenced
if utility is nonlinear.
4.6 Conclusion
We have tested rank-dependent utility for three-outcome gambles. There is some
evidence for rank-dependence of decision weights. The pattern is, however, not
very clear, with evidence for pessimism, optimism, and inverse-S all present. The
certainty eﬀect does not seem to be prominent in this experiment. A response
mode eﬀect, whereby participants tend to switch preference at the same places
of ten-tuples without suﬃcient considerations of the gambles and their payoﬀs,
seems to play a role in our data. Remarkably, we found pronounced risk seeking,
contrary to the empirical ﬁndings for decision under risk as well as for decision
under ambiguity. It seems that there may be a small role for rank-dependence to
explain risky decisions. For the major part, however, risky decisions seem to be
governed by factors not yet modeled in decision theories.78 References
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81Chapter 5
Dutch Books: Avoiding Strategic
and Dynamic Complications, and
a Comonotonic Extension
5.1 Introduction
D eF i n e t t i ’ sb o o k - m a k i n gp r i n c i p l ee n t a i l st h a tag a m b l e rs h o u l dn o th a v ep r e f -
erences that can be linearly combined into a sure loss. A surprising implication is
that all uncertainties have to be quantiﬁable by means of additive probabilities,
which may possibly be subjective (de Finetti 1931, 1937, 1974). The principle
has, since its discovery, served as a justiﬁcation of Bayesianism. The main restric-
tion of the book-making principle is that it requires outcomes to be expressed in
utils, in other words, utility must be linear. This requirement is reasonable for
small stakes (Rabin 2000).
Linear combinations of gambles naturally arise in ﬁnancial markets, where assets
can be bought and sold at ﬁxed rates. The book-making principle then amounts
to a no-arbitrage requirement, which is commonly considered normative in ﬁnance
(Nau & McCardle 1991, Varian 1987).
0The results in this chapter were ﬁrst formulated in Diecidue, Enrico and Peter P. Wakker,
(2001), “Dutch Books: Avoiding Strategic and Dynamic Complications, and a Comonotonic
Extension.” Mathematical Social Sciences, forthcoming.
8384 5.1. Introduction
Section 5.2 presents a formalization of de Finetti’s book-making principle that
deviates from other presentations. First, we formulate the principle for a static
individual preference system, thus eschewing all dynamic and game-theoretic
complications. Second, our principle is completely formalized whereas in the
literature it is commonly used in a broad and informal sense. Our formalization
is closely related to an additivity condition for preferences that is well-known
in decision theory and that has been studied extensively in the mathematics
literature.
There are many descriptive reasons and, according to some authors, also nor-
mative reasons for deviations from Bayesianism. This insight has resulted from
the Allais (1953) and Ellsberg (1961) paradoxes and has led to a rich literature
(Camerer & Weber 1992, Grant, Kajii, & Polak 2000, Schmidt 1998, Starmer
2000). The most popular models today are the rank-dependent models (Quiggin
1981, Schmeidler 1989, Tversky & Kahneman 1992, Yaari 1987). They allow
for a nonlinear weighting of uncertainty, modeled through nonadditive measures
(capacities). Decision weights of events depend on how favorable the outcomes of
the events are in comparison to the alternative outcomes of the gamble under con-
sideration (rank-dependence). Basic rationality requirements such as transitivity
and monotonicity are maintained but many other deviations from Bayesianism
can be accommodated. Examples are pessimism (aversion to uncertainty; con-
vex capacities), optimism (concave capacities), and insuﬃcient sensitivity towards
varying degrees of uncertainty (inverse-S capacities, overweighting unlikely events
and underweighting likely events, see Tversky & Kahneman 1992).
In ﬁnancial portfolios, investing in negatively correlated assets (hedging) is de-
sirable. This phenomenon can be modeled by pessimism and convex capacities.
The nonlinear weighting of uncertainty is also important in explanations of in-
surance. Wakker, Thaler, & Tversky (1997) found that the common aversion of
people to incomplete insurance cannot be explained by curvature of utility but
can be explained by nonlinear probabilities.
Section 5.3 extends the book-making principle to the rank-dependent models.
We maintain the hypothesis that outcomes are utils and then identify the books
that can be made1 against the rank-dependent models. It can easily be seen that
books cannot be made whenever the gambles considered are comonotonic (same
1making a book (also called Dutch book) means a violation of the book-making principle5. Dutch Books: Avoiding Strategic and Dynamic Complications, and a
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ordering of events according to favorableness of outcomes). Examples will demon-
strate that books can be made because of hedging, optimism, or other phenomena
related to noncomonotonic gambles. In situations where such phenomena are de-
scriptively or even normatively desirable, the exclusion of books is unwarranted.
This paper studies a comonotonic book-making principle that does not exclude
books unless all gambles are comonotonic. It thereby allows for hedging, opti-
mism, ambiguity aversion, etc. We show that such a book-making principle is not
only necessary, but also suﬃcient, for the rank-dependent models, given payment
in utils. Hence, a new preference-axiomatization of the rank-dependent models
results. In a mathematical sense, our result extends Yaari’s (1987) theorem (and
the, almost identical, Theorem 3 of Weymark 1981) from risk to uncertainty. It
is remarkable that de Finetti’s book-making principle, usually considered to be
inextricably associated with additive probabilities, can so easily be adapted to
nonadditive probabilities.
5.2 de Finetti’s Book-making Principle
This section gives a new formalization of de Finetti’s book-making principle.
S = {s1,...,sn} is a ﬁnite state space, with subsets called events.O n e o f t h e
states is true and the others are not true. A decision maker is uncertain about
which state is true. Outcomes are real numbers designating money. A gamble is
a state-contingent payoﬀ,e . g .aﬁnancial asset. Formally, a gamble f is a function
from the state space to the outcomes. Gamble f will generate outcome f(s) if s
is the true state of nature. Gambles are often identiﬁed with n-tuples and, hence,
t h es e to fg a m b l e si si d e n t i ﬁed with IR n. Sometimes probabilities of the states
are given. Then the state space is a probability space and gambles are random
variables. In general, probabilities need not be given.
By < we denote the preference relation of the decision maker over the gambles. It
is a weak order if it is complete (f < g or g < f for all gambles f,g) and transitive.
The notation Â and ∼ is as usual. Strict monotonicity holds if f Â g whenever
f>g(f>gmeans that f(s) >g (s) for all states s). For a gamble f,afair price
is an outcome x such that x ∼ f. As usual, outcomes are identiﬁed with constant
gambles. A function V represents a preference relation < if V (f) ≥ V (g) if and
only if f < g, for all gambles f,g.86 5.2. de Finetti’s Book-making Principle
The book-making principle, also called coherence by de Finetti, is based on the
idea that a number of good decisions, when taken together, should still be good.
“Taken together” is interpreted as outcome-wise addition. A book, deﬁned for-
mally hereafter, consists of a number of preferences that, when taken together,
yield a loss for each state of nature. Obviously, such a result is not good and
therefore the book-making principle requires that no book exists.











gj(s) for all states s. ¤
In words, if replacing gj by fj is good for each j, then the joint result of these re-
placements should not be a sure loss. Our presentation diﬀers from de Finetti’s in
a number of respects. First, de Finetti also considered multiplication by positive







jgj(s) for some positive λ
js. We have dropped such
scalar multiplication because we ﬁnd addition a more appealing way of combining
gambles, and because scalar multiplication can be derived from addition so that
a greater mathematical generality is obtained. Second, de Finetti considered a
game situation where an outside person can take the decision maker up on any
of his preferences. We have formulated the condition in a single-person decision
context so as to avoid distortions resulting from strategic considerations (Border
& Segal 1994; de Finetti 1937, footnote (a) in the 1964 translation; de Finetti
1974 p. 93) and the state of information of the outside person.
Third, as will be demonstrated in Theorem 5.2, the book-making principle is
based on two conditions, strict monotonicity and additivity (f < g implies f +
h < g + h for all gambles f,g,h). In his discussions, de Finetti emphasized
monotonicity but we, like many other authors, think that the essence of the5. Dutch Books: Avoiding Strategic and Dynamic Complications, and a
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book-making principle lies in additivity (Camerer & Weber 1992 p. 359 second
full paragraph, Schick 1986). For moderate stakes, additivity seems to be a
reasonable condition. The receipt of gamble h does not change the situation
or needs of the decision maker much and therefore it seems reasonable that the
preference between f and g is not aﬀected.
Fourth, de Finetti did not impose the completeness requirement on all gambles
but, instead, he took an arbitrary set of gambles and their fair prices as the initial
domain of preference. Because all linear combinations were also incorporated, his
domain was a linear subspace on which, through the fair prices, a weak order was
obtained. The extension of the following theorem to linear subspaces is omitted
for simplicity.
One case of a linear subspace is of special interest. It is the case in which the book-
making principle is restricted to judgements of acceptability of single gambles fj.
Gamble fj is called acceptable if fj < (0,...,0). In other words, Deﬁnition 5.1
is restricted to gj =( 0 ,...,0) for all j . The acceptable gambles are those that
are evaluated nonnegatively. An alternative interpretation of the favorableness of
gambles is sometimes used (Camerer & Weber 1992 p. 359). This relates a general
preference fj < gj to a favorableness judgment fj−gj < 0. In this interpretation,
prior endowments of the gjs to the agent are assumed and exchanges for fj are
considered, for each j, leading to a sure net loss.
Several modern papers use the term (Dutch) book-making for dynamic decision
principles. These descriptions can sometimes lead to confusion if some of the
dynamic decision principles assumed are left implicit, or if the domain of choice
options changes in the course of the example in ways that essentially change the
strategic situation (criticized by Machina, 1989, as hidden nodes). We do not
assume dynamic or sequential choices, and all preferences in Deﬁnition 5.1 and
elsewhere are assumed to be part of one static preference system. By eschewing
dynamic and strategic aspects and, thereby, their distortions, we hope to obtain
an unambiguous condition that contains the essence of de Finetti’s book-making
principle. The following theorem shows that our condition does indeed imply de
Finetti’s main objective, i.e., the existence of subjective probabilities.
Theorem 5.2 The following three statements are equivalent for < on IR n.
(i) There exist probabilities p1,...,pn such that preferences maximize expected88
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value f 7→ p1f (s1)+... + pnf (sn).
(ii) < is a weak order, for each gamble there exists a fair price, and no book
can be made.
(iii) < is a weak order, for each gamble there exists a fair price, and additivity
and strict monotonicity are satisﬁed.
Furthermore, the probabilities in (i) are uniquely determined. ¤
We end this section with some comments on related mathematical results. There
are many results similar to the equivalence of (i) and (iii) with continuity instead
of the fair price condition and with an invariance condition for scalar multiplica-
tion (homotheticity) added (Nau 1992, Regazzini 1987, Schervish, Seidenfeld, &
Kadane 2000, Weibull 1985). Additivity of preference amounts to commutativity
of an ordering and an addition operation, which has been extensively studied
in the mathematics literature (Birkhoﬀ 1967 Chapter 15, Fuchssteiner & Lusky
1981, Krantz, Luce, Suppes, & Tversky 1971 Section 2.2.5). These studies often
considered more general state spaces and outcome spaces. Blackwell & Girshick
(1954, Theorem 4.3.1 and Problem 4.3.1) and Wakker (1989, Theorem A2.1)
presented related results that did not use scalar multiplication either but used
a stronger monotonicity condition plus continuity. Candeal & Induráin (1995)
and Neuefeind & Trockel (1995) presented results without monotonicity for the
preference relation or the representing linear functional. The mathematics is re-
lated to invariance conditions for preferences with respect to mixing operations
(Fishburn 1982, von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944), which similarly lead to lin-
ear representations. In Theorem 5.2, we do not seek for maximal mathematical
generality. The purpose of the theorem is to present de Finetti’s book-making
principle for deriving subjective probabilities while avoiding game-theoretic and
dynamic complications.
5.3 Hedging, Uncertainty Aversion,
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This section presents three examples of violations of the book-making principle.
The ﬁrst illustrates how books can help uncover what we consider to be irrational-5. Dutch Books: Avoiding Strategic and Dynamic Complications, and a
Comonotonic Extension 89
ities.2 The second is based on hedging, which was put forward as a rationale for
the rank-dependent models by Yaari (1987, p. 104). The third example, the
Ellsberg paradox, shows how aversion to unknown probabilities leads to a book,
illustrating once more that additive probabilities cannot describe this paradox.
Camerer & Weber (1992, Section 5.8) describe a similar example, formulated as
a dynamic game.
Example 5.3 [Roulette] Consider gambles on a roulette wheel. There are 37
states of nature, corresponding to one of the numbers 0, ..., 36 being selected.
A bet of $1 on a single number yields a net proﬁto f$36 − $1 = $35 if the
number shows up and −$1 otherwise. A gambler may be indiﬀerent to the choice







(−1,−1,−1,...,35) < (0,...,0) but
(−1,−1,−1,...,−1) < (0,...,0). ¤
Example 5.4 [ H e d g i n g ]A s s u m et h a tac o i ni st o s s e do n c ea n dt h es t a t es p a c ei s
{heads, tails}. (20,0) denotes the gamble yielding $20 for heads and $0 for tails.
The other gambles are deﬁn e ds i m i l a r l ya n dr e l a t et ot h es a m et o s so ft h ec o i n .
The following preferences are natural but generate a book.
(9,9) < (20,0)
(9,9) < (0,20) but
(18,18) < (20,20).
2As a matter of personal opinion, we consider rank-dependent utility, and thereby our
comonotonic weakening of the book-making principle, to be primarily of descriptive interest.90
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The preferences in this example are traditionally explained by expected utility with
concave utility. For moderate stakes, however, utility is close to linear and an
alternative explanation for the observed risk aversion seems to be more plausible.
Such an alternative explanation, based on a nonlinear weighting of uncertainty,
will be provided later. Note that when the gambles (20,0) and (0,20) are taken
together, one gamble serves as a hedge for the other. ¤
Example 5.5 [Ellsberg Example] Assume an urn K (known) containing red and
black balls in equal proportions and an urn A (unknown or ambiguous) con-
taining red and black balls in an unknown proportion. A ball will be drawn
at random from each urn, and its color will be inspected. The state space is
{BkBa,B kRa,R kBa,R kRa},w h e r eBkRa refers to a black ball from urn K and a
red ball from urn A, and the other states are deﬁned similarly. Gamble (1,0,1,0)
yields $1 if the ball from A is black and nothing otherwise; other gambles are de-
ﬁned similarly. The following two preferences are commonly observed for   =0 .
For  >0 suﬃciently small they will still hold and, when taken together, yield a
book.
(1,1,0,0) < (1 +  ,0,1+ ,0)
(0,0,1,1) < (0,1+ ,0,1+ ) but
(1,1,1,1) < (1 +  ,1+ ,1+ ,1+ ).
The left gambles provide a hedge for each other, as in the preceding example,
because their combination replaces risk with certainty. This same hedging takes
place when the right gambles are combined but, in addition, the uncertainty about
the probabilities is removed. It is well known that these preferences cannot be
explained by expected utility or any other model using additive probabilities. ¤
The preceding examples have something in common. In each of them, the best-
ranked outcomes of one gamble are combined with the worst-ranked outcomes of
other gambles. In that manner, the outcomes neutralize each other, leading to a
gamble of lower variance. Let us consider Example 5.3 in some detail. For each
gamble, the good outcome $35 is neutralized by the bad outcomes −$1 of the other
gambles in the combination. In this example, the combination may lead to an
overall loss of value: If the gambler takes up a single gamble, then the probability
of gaining $35 changes from 0 to 1/37, i.e. from impossible to possible. It is well5. Dutch Books: Avoiding Strategic and Dynamic Complications, and a
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known that people especially appreciate such a change, which brings hope. If the
gambler already received one or more gambles, then he already had the possibility
of receiving $35. Receiving an extra gamble still increases the probability of
winning $35 by 1/37, but no more changes this event from impossible to possible.
A sort of psychological substitutability occurs between the various gambles, where
the positive value of hoping for $35, provided by a single gamble, is reduced when
this hope has already been provided by another gamble. This psychological eﬀect
can explain why the gambler likes each gamble in isolation but not all gambles
when taken together, and why it may be worthwhile to allow for such phenomena
in a descriptive model.
In Example 5.4, the unfavorableness of the event of gaining nothing is especially
salient, explaining the preference against (20,0) or (0,20) in isolation. If these
gambles are combined, however, then the favorable $20 outcome of each gamble
neutralizes the possibility of gaining nothing of the other gamble, and a sure gain
results. Here a complementarity eﬀect occurs in the combination of the gambles.
Besides this complementarity eﬀect, another complementarity eﬀect occurs in the
combination of (1 +  ,0,1+ ,0) and (0,1+ ,0,1+ ) in Example 5.5, because
the uncertainty about the unknown probabilities of the outcomes is removed.
In each example, the variability of one gamble is tempered by the counter-
variability of the other(s). The above-mentioned interaction eﬀects do not arise
when the gambles added are comonotonic. A set of gambles is comonotonic if for
each pair of elements f,g there do not exist states s,t such that f(s) >f(t) and
g(s) <g (t).
The preceding considerations suggest a generalization of the book-making princi-
ple. A comonotonic book is a book as in Deﬁnition 5.1 with the extra restriction
that the set of gambles considered, {f1,...,fn,g 1,...,gn}, is comonotonic. The
comonotonic book-making principle requires that no comonotonic book exists.
Similarly, comonotonic additivity means that f < g implies f +h < g +h for all
comonotonic gambles f,g,h.
Choquet expected value is the model characterized by the comonotonic book-
making principle. It is the rank-dependent model for decision under uncertainty,
i.e. the context where no probabilities are given. Because payment is in utils, no
utility function need to be deﬁned; utility is assumed to be linear. We therefore
use the term Choquet expected value instead of Choquet expected utility. A92
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capacity W is a function W :2 S → [0,1] satisfying: (a) W(∅)=0 ,( b )W(S)=1 ,
and (c) W is nondecreasing with respect to set inclusion. Choquet expected value





represents <,w h e r et h edecision weights πj are deﬁned as follows. First, a
permutation ρ is chosen such that f(sρ(1)) > ··· > f(sρ(n)).N e x t , πρ(i) =
W({sρ(1),...,s ρ(i)} − W({sρ(1),...,s ρ(i−1)}; in particular, πρ(1) = W(sρ(1)).T h e
decision weights are nonnegative and sum to one. The following theorem charac-
terizes Choquet expected value.
Theorem 5.6 The following three statements are equivalent for the preference
relation < on IR n.
(i) There exist a capacity W such that preferences maximize Choquet expected
value.
(ii) The binary relation < is a weak order, for each gamble there exists a fair
price, and no comonotonic book can be made.
(iii) The binary relation < is a weak order, for each gamble there exists a fair
price, and comonotonic additivity and strict monotonicity are satisﬁed.
Furthermore, the capacity W in (i) is uniquely determined. ¤
Choquet expected value can accommodate the phenomena in the examples. For
example, a capacity W that assigns a weight exceeding 1/36 to each number can
explain the risk seeking in Example 5.3. This capacity implies an overweighting
of unlikely events and risk seeking for long-shot options. In Example 5.4, hedg-
ing can be explained by a capacity W with W(Heads)=W(Tails) <. 45.T h i s
choice yields a decision weight of less than .45 for the 20 outcome and a decision
weight exceeding .55 for the zero outcome. Consequently, the observed risk aver-
sion is not ascribed to diminishing marginal utility as was traditionally done, but
to the extra attention paid to the zero outcome. The aversion to unknown prob-
abilities in Example 5.5 can be explained by any capacity W assigning a greater5. Dutch Books: Avoiding Strategic and Dynamic Complications, and a
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value to the events {BkBa,B kRa} and {RkBa,R kRa}, which describe the colors
from the known urn K, than to the events {BkBa,R kBa} and {BkRa,R kRa},
which describe the colors from the unknown urn A.
We end this section with some comments on related mathematical results. There
have been several variations on Statement (iii) in the literature. De Waegenaere &
Wakker (1999) used comonotonic additivity together with continuity but without
any monotonicity to characterize a nonmonotonic generalization. Previously,
Schmeidler (1986) used a comonotonic additivity condition for functionals, in
combination with continuity, to characterize noncomonotonic functionals; he also
characterized the monotonic case. Schmeidler’s (1989) comonotonic mixture-
invariance condition for preferences is famous. It was used to obtain linearity with
respect to second-stage probabilities. Chateauneuf (1991, Theorem 1) generalized
Schmeidler’s preference condition, considering mixtures of outcomes rather than
of probabilities. Future research can be devoted to investigate whether the result
in Theorem 5.6 can be extended to represent preferences in the sense of Castagnoli
and Maccheroni (2000).
5.4 Discussion
The book-making principle relies on linear utility. Utility is approximately linear
for moderate amounts of money (Edwards 1955, Fox, Rogers, & Tversky 1996,
Lopes & Oden 1999 p. 290, Luce 2000 p. 86, Ramsey 1931 p. 176, Rabin 2000,
Savage 1954 p. 91). The rank-dependent model suggests that a considerable part
of the deviations from expected value observed for moderate amounts of money,
traditionally ascribed to curvature of utility, is due to a nonlinear weighting of
probability. This suggestion is supported empirically by Selten, Sadrieh, & Ab-
bing (1999). They compared the eﬀects of nonlinear utility with those of nonlinear
probability weighting. For the small outcomes considered (ranging between −$1
and $3), the nonlinearity of probability weighting was more pronounced. Yaari
(1987) also assumed linear utility in his derivation of rank-dependent utility for
risk and our model can be considered the generalization of Yaari’s model to un-
certainty.
We next consider some empirical implications of our work. Many studies into
the nature of nonadditive probabilities are going on today. If both utilities and94 Appendix
probability weights are unknown, complex measurement methods have to be used
(Abdellaoui 2000, Bleichrodt & Pinto 2000, Gonzalez & Wu 1999, Loehman 1998,
Tversky & Kahneman 1992). With linear utility, axiomatized in the present
paper, as a good approximation for moderate stakes, gambles with moderate
stakes provide an easy tool for measuring nonlinear probability weighting (Kilka
& Weber 2000, Diecidue, Wakker, & Zeelenberg, in preparation).
Our model can be interpreted as a return to Preston & Baratta (1948). This
paper, one of the earliest empirical studies of risk attitude, used nonlinear proba-
bilities rather than nonlinear utilities to explain deviations from expected value.
In the following decades, expected utility was the dominant model and Preston &
Baratta’s study was usually criticized for its way of modeling risk attitude. From
the current perspective of rank-dependent utility and prospect theory, however,
nonlinear probabilities are useful concepts. If the plausible assumption of linear
utility for small stakes is added, then the analysis of Preston & Baratta seems
to be appropriate again, and our paper has provided a preference axiomatization
for it.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 5.2. The implication (i) ⇒ (ii) follows from substitution.
Next we assume (ii) and derive (iii). For strict monotonicity, assume that f < g
and f(s) <g (s) for all s. This preference and inequality constitute a book (with
n =1in Deﬁnition 5.1) and, hence, a contradiction. Strict monotonicity must
hold. For each gamble f,d e ﬁne FP(f) as the fair price of gamble f. FP is
uniquely determined and represents preference (f < g if and only if FP(f) >
FP(g);n o t et h a tx>yimplies x Â y because of strict monotonicity). We
claim that FP satisﬁes additivity (FP(f + g)=FP(f)+FP(g),a l s ok n o w na s
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f + g + FP(f + g) <f+ g + FP(f)+FP(g)
results and, hence, a contradiction. If FP(f + g) >F P (f)+FP(g) then the
reversed preferences result in a book. Additivity of FP follows. This implies
additivity of <; hence, Statement (iii) follows.
We ﬁnally assume (iii) and derive (i) and the uniqueness result. FP is deﬁned
as above and represents preferences. We again derive additivity of FP. f ∼
FP(f) implies, by two-fold application of additivity (with < and with 4), that
f + g ∼ FP(f)+g. Additivity and g ∼ FP(g) imply that g + FP(f) ∼
FP(g)+FP(f). Transitivity implies that f + g ∼ FP(f)+FP(g); hence,
FP(f + g)=FP(f)+FP(g).W ec o n c l u d et h a tFP is additive.
Additivity means that Cauchy’s functional equation holds which, together with
strict monotonicity, implies that FP is a linear functional (Aczél 1966 Theorem
5.1.1.1; our strict monotonicity implies the existence of a measurable majorant
on a set of positive measure, e.g., FP(1,...,1) is the majorant on the set of
gambles dominated by (1,...,1)). FP(f)=
Pn
j=1 pjf(sj) for real numbers pj.
The pjs are nonnegative for if one, say p1,w e r en e g a t i v et h e nw ec o u l dﬁnd
ag a m b l e(M,1,...,1) with M s ol a r g et h a tt h eFP of the gamble would be
negative, implying that it is less preferred than the 0 gamble, thus violating
strict monotonicity. FP(1) = 1 implies that the pjs sum to one. Statement (i)
has been proved.
For uniqueness, FP(1,0,...,0) = p1 determines p1 in a unique manner because
of strict monotonicity. Similarly, every pj is uniquely determined. ¤
Proof of Theorem 5.6. The implication (i) ⇒ (ii) follows from substitution.
Next assume that (ii) holds. We derive (iii). For strict monotonicity, assume
that f < g and f(s) <g (s) for all s. Also assume, ﬁrst, that f and g are
comonotonic. Then the preference and inequality constitute a comonotonic book
and, hence, a contradiction. Therefore, comonotonic strict monotonicity holds,
i.e. strict monotonicity holds within sets of comonotonic gambles. Lemma 5.7
will demonstrate that strict monotonicity holds in full force.
Comonotonic additivity is derived as in the proof of (ii) ⇒ (iii) in Theorem
5.2, with the appropriate comonotonicity requirements added. These do not
complicate the reasoning. Note that constant gambles are comonotonic with all96 Appendix
other gambles.
We ﬁnally assume (iii) and derive (i) and uniqueness. That FP represents pref-
erences and satisﬁes comonotonic additivity (FP(f +g)=FP(f)+FP(g) holds
whenever f and g are comonotonic) is demonstrated exactly as in the proof of
Theorem 5.2, again with all appropriate comonotonicity requirements added. We
show that FP is a Choquet integral.
For any event E and real λ, λE denotes λ times the indicator function of E.F o r
any ﬁxed E, λ 7→ FP(λE) satisﬁes Cauchy’s equation on the nonnegative reals.
On this set, the mapping is bounded on a nondegenerate interval, i.e. it is bounded
above on [0,1] by FP(2,...,2).H e n c e , FP is linear on this set (Aczél 1966,
Theorem 2.1.1.1) and FP(λE)=λW(E) for the real number W(E)=FP(1E).
W(∅)=0and W(S)=1follow because FP assigns fair prices. W is monotonic
with respect to set inclusion: If A ⊃ B but W(A) <W(B),t h e nw ec a nﬁnd a
λ suﬃciently large to imply FP(λA +( 1 ,...,1)) = FP(λA)+FP(1,...,1)) =
λW(A)+1<λ W(B)=FP(λB), contradicting strict monotonicity. Hence, W
is monotonic with respect to set inclusion, which implies that W is nonnegative.
Every gamble can be written as a sum
Pm
j=1 λjEj −(M,...,M) for nonnegative
λj, nonnegative M, and decreasing sets E1 ⊃ ··· ⊃ Em.T o w i t , i n E1 − E2
the gamble is minimal, its second-smallest value is taken in E2 − E3,e t c .I ft h e
minimal value is negative then M is taken positive and large enough as to have
λ1 nonnegative. By comonotonic additivity, FP(
Pm




j=1 λjW(Ej)−M, which is the Choquet
expected value of the gamble with respect to the capacity W. Statement (i) is
proved.
Uniqueness of W follows because the sure amount of money W(E) is the certainty
equivalent of the indicator function 1E and it is uniquely determined because of
strict monotonicity. ¤
Lemma 5.7 Let < be a weak order on the set of gambles that satisﬁes comonotonic
strict monotonicity. Then it satisﬁes strict monotonicity.
Proof. Throughout this proof, we write hj for h(sj), for all h,j. Assume that
gj >f j for all j.I f f and g are comonotonic then we are done, so assume
they are not. The plan is to change gamble f, step by step, into a gamble that5. Dutch Books: Avoiding Strategic and Dynamic Complications, and a
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is weakly preferred to f, that is strictly dominated by g statewise, and that is
also comonotonic with g.T h e n g is strictly preferred to that gamble and, by
transitivity, the desired preference g Â f follows. In each step, the new act is
comonotonic with, and weakly preferred to, the one constructed before. We will
assume, without loss of generality, that
g1 ≥ ...≥ gn. (5.1)
Take any permutation ρ1,...,ρ n of 1,...,nsuch that fρ1 ≥ ...≥ fρn.B e c a u s ef
is not comonotonic with g, ρ cannot be the identity, and there is an i such that
ρi >ρ i+1. The squared Euclidean distance between (ρ1,...,ρ n) and (1,...,n),
i.e.
Pn
j=1(ρj −j)2, is positive and is a natural number. It will be reduced at each
step until the newly constructed gamble is comonotonic with g and the distance
is zero.
We change the pair (f,ρ) i n t oap a i r(f0,ρ 0) with again f0
ρ0
1 ≥ ...≥ f0
ρ0
n, as follows.
First, with i as above, ρ0
i+1 = ρi and ρ0
i = ρi+1, ρ0
k = ρk for all other k.F u r t h e r
Case 1. fρi = fρi+1.S e tf = f0.
Case 2. fρi >f ρi+1. We will increase the ρi+1th coordinate to become equal to
the ρith. Because we are only given comonotonic monotonicity in a strict sense,
we next increase all coordinates by a small positive   so as to guarantee that
the new gamble is weakly (even strictly) preferred to the previous one. Formally,
deﬁne f0
ρk = fρk+  for all k 6= i+1with the positive   so small that still f0
ρk <g ρk
for all k 6= i +1 .D e ﬁne f0
ρi+1 = fρi +  .W eh a v ef0
ρi+1 = f0
ρi <g ρi ≤ gρi+1,t h e
latter inequality following from ρi >ρ i+1 and Eq. 5.1, so that f0 is still dominated
by g statewise.
W eh a v e ,i ne a c hc a s e :f0 is comonotonic with f; f0 is still dominated by g state-
wise, f0 < f (by reﬂexivity in the ﬁrst case and by comonotonic strict monotonic-
ity in the second). The squared Euclidean distance between (ρ0
1,...,ρ 0
n) and
(1,...,n) has decreased as compared to that between (ρ1,...,ρ n) and (1,...,n).
Each time when the newly constructed gamble is not comonotonic with g,w ea p -
ply the same procedure, each time decreasing the Euclidean distance between the
new permutation and the identity permutation. Because the Euclidean distances
are natural numbers, the process must stop at some stage. It can (but need not)
be seen that the number of steps is identical to the number of pairs i,j such that
i>jbut ρi <ρ j,w i t hρ as deﬁned below Eq. 5.1.98 Appendix
A gamble has resulted that is strictly dominated by g statewise, is also comonotonic
with g, and is weakly preferred to f. g Â f follows. ¤5. Dutch Books: Avoiding Strategic and Dynamic Complications, and a
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Coherence without Additivity
6.1 Introduction
The Dutch book argument of de Finetti (1931) is a classic coherence condition for
the existence and uniqueness of subjective probabilities. It gives also a standard
justiﬁcation for a model of choice based on subjective probabilities. Its appeal and
beauty are given by a concept of probability based on everyday life considerations
like betting. De Finetti (1976) presented the Dutch book argument
“...In English, a combination of bets devised in such a way that,
proﬁting by an inconsistency in the odds given by the bookmaker,
someone is certain to win whatever happens is called ‘Dutch Book’ (I
don’t know why). However, if one wants to, this term could be used
to express the condition of consistency that is the sole basis on which
the whole theory of probability rests: suﬃce it to say that it consists
in allowing no chance of a Dutch Book occurring....” (for the formal
statement see Wakker, 1989).
A c c o r d i n gt oK y b u r ga n dS m o k l e r( 1 9 6 4 ,p age 11): “The restriction to coherence
thus formulates a natural criterion of rationality in situations of uncertainty.
0The results in this chapter were ﬁrst formulated in Diecidue, Enrico & Fabio Maccheroni
(2000), “Coherence without Additivity.” CentER, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Nether-
lands.
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Rationality is used in a normative sense here; coherence formulates a criterion
of how a person’s degrees of belief ought to be related.” The debate on the
normative aspect of the argument is still going on.
In its original formulation, the argument is not immune to descriptive violations:
its behavioral bite has been challenged by experimental evidence (see Ellsberg
1961, Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Consider the following example.
Suppose Bruna decides to purchase an insurance contract for her country house,
clearly the insurance payments depend on some states of the world (for exam-
ple ﬁre, ﬂood, earthquake). Her preferences among contracts are the following:
(3,3,3) < (12,0,0), (3,3,3) < (0,12,0),a n d(3,3,3) < (0,0,12). The contract
(12,0,0) means 12 if ﬁre, 0 if ﬂood, and 0 if earthquake. The other contracts
are deﬁned similarly. These preferences are behaviorally plausible: in order to
obtain a general purpose coverage, Bruna prefers to receive an equal and rel-
atively small reimbursement in all states of the world, than taking the risk of
full reimbursement in one state and nothing in the others. Considering all the
preferences together, it gives (9,9,9) < (12,12,12): a Dutch book. It looks like
an undesirable result: a set of good decisions, when taken together should still
be good.
This note, while maintaining de Finetti’s spirit, shows how to extend and gener-
a l i z et h eD u t c hb o o ka r g u m e n ti no r d e rt oa c c o m m o d a t et h i sk i n do fd e s c r i p t i v e
violations. The way to accommodate them is given by a generalized concept of
coherence in a nonadditive environment. The ﬁrst step is to allow Dutch books
only when the involved gambles are not comonotonic (as in Bruna’s country house
example), thus extending to the inﬁnite case Theorem 6 in Diecidue and Wakker
(2001) and providing a general, Dutch book based, characterization of the most
popular rank-dependent model of Choquet expected utility. From an empirical
point of view rank-dependent models have received a good deal of attention (see
Birnbaum & McIntosh 1996, Bleichrodt & Pinto 2000, Gonzalez & Wu 1999,
Harless & Camerer 1994, Tversky & Fox 1995). In particular many works fo-
cus on the evaluation of the rank-dependent probabilities (see Abdellaoui 2000,
Bleichrodt, van Rijn and Johannesson 1999, Luce 2001, Tversky & Kahneman
1992).
In addition, consider the following example.6. Coherence without Additivity 107
John needs a new bike. He has found a second hand one for $40. He is now
at the horse race trying to get this amount of money. He is evaluating alterna-
tive monetary gambles on a three-horses race and has the following preferences:
(40,50,60) < (30,80,90) and (40,80,90) < (60,60,70).T h eg a m b l e(40,50,60)
means that John will get $40 if the ﬁrst horse wins the race, $50 if the second horse
wins, and $60 if the third wins. The other gambles are deﬁned similarly. The
ﬁrst preference is motivated by the need of the bike: the second gamble involves
the risk of not aﬀording it. This time, the involved gambles are comonotonic, but
considering all the preferences together, it gives (80,130,150) < (90,140,160):a
comonotonic Dutch book. This calls for additional generalizations.
We will consider two of them: ﬁrst, allowing Dutch books only when the involved
gambles are not aﬃnely related, thus providing a, Dutch book based, character-
ization of invariant biseparable preferences (Ghirardato, Maccheroni, Marinacci
2001) and, with a further uncertainty aversion assumption Min expected utility
the generalized expected utility model most successful for ﬁnance applications
(see Epstein & Wang 1994 and Epstein & Zin 1989).
Second, considering the minimal requirement of no Dutch books when the in-
volved gambles are sure prospects leading to a very general, still appealing, con-
cept of prevision.
To sum up. De Finetti, via the Dutch book argument, justiﬁed a model of choice
based on subjective probabilities. It seems thus natural to extend and generalize
de Finetti’s result in such a manner that the generalized argument can provide
a new foundation for the aforementioned nonexpected utility models of choice.
Constant additivity plays a crucial role in the derivation of our result. This
assumption underlies both Choquet expected utility of Schmeidler (1989) and
Multiple Priors of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
These models are more and more popular and successful in economics and psy-
chology, see for example Camerer (1999) and Starmer (2000). From an applied
point of view, QALY evaluations of health policies in a rank-dependent spirit
have received increasing attention (Bleichrodt, van Rijn and Johannesson 1999,
Miyamoto 1988, 1999).
In the next section we present the result, then conclusions follow.108 6.2. Generalized Dutch books and coherence
6.2 Generalized Dutch books and coherence
6.2.1 The set-up
We consider a standard subjective setting; bets are simply “...wagers (sic) on any
facts and for any amount...” (de Finetti 1976). Formally, let S be the set of
states of the world and Σ be the events algebra. A bet is represented by a simple
random number φ =
PN
i=1 αi|Ai| (the bettor wins αi if Ai obtains), or, in general,
by a bounded random number f (the bettor wins f (s) if s obtains). The set of
a l ls i m p l eb e t si sB0 = B0 (S,Σ), while the set of all bets is B = B (S,Σ).1
Let < be a binary relation on B representing the preferences of a decision maker
among the bets; as usual, Â denotes the asymmetric part of <,a n d∼ denotes
the symmetric one. The crucial notion is the following.





M ∈ B0 such that φ
j < ψ








j (s),f o r
all states s ∈ S.
This notion represents something undesirable, therefore coherence requires that
no Dutch book is allowed. Whenever all the involved bets are pairwise comonotonic
we call the book a comonotonic Dutch book, while if they are aﬃnely related2 we
call it aﬃne Dutch book, ﬁnally when they are constant we call it trivial Dutch
book.
I nt h es e q u e lw em a k eu s eo ft h ef o l l o w i n gp r o p e r t i e so f<.
• Weak Order: For all f and g in B: f < g or g < f. For all f,g,a n dh
in B:i ff < g and g < h,t h e nf < h.
• Monotonicity: For all f and g in B:i ff (s) ≥ g(s) for all s ∈ S,t h e n
f < g.
• Fair Price: For all f in B,t h e r ee x i s t sx ∈ R such that f ∼ x.
1It is the supnorm closure of the vector space of all simple measurable random numbers.
2The term is of Ghirardato, Klibanoﬀ and Marinacci (1998); f and g are aﬃnely related if
there exists α ≥ 0 and β ∈ R such that f = αg + β or g = αf + β.6. Coherence without Additivity 109
• Uncertainty Aversion: For all f and g in B and all α in (0,1): f ∼ g
implies αf +( 1− α)g < f.
Before stating the result a few more ingredients are needed. A functional V :
B → R is monotonic if V (f) ≥ V (g) whenever f ≥ g,i ti saprevision if
it is monotonic and V (β)=β for all β ∈ R, ﬁnally it is constant-linear if
V (αf + β)=αV (f)+β for all f ∈ B, α ≥ 0 and β ∈ R.
6.2.2 The result
We can now state the representation result of this note.
Theorem 6.2 A binary relation < on B is a monotonic weak order that satisﬁes
the fair price property and allows no trivial Dutch books iﬀ there exists a prevision
V : B → R representing <.M o r e o v e r :
(i) the relation < allows no aﬃne Dutch books iﬀ the prevision V is constant-
linear;
(ii) the relation < allows no comonotonic Dutch books iﬀ there exists a capacity
C such that V (f)=
R
S fdC.




The prevision V is unique.
As anticipated in the Introduction, (i) characterizes invariant biseparable pref-
erences, (ii) extending to the inﬁnite case Diecidue and Wakker (2001) yields
Choquet expected utility, while (iii) is the famous de Finetti Dutch book Theo-
rem. Among the many works referring to point three we mention: Blackwell and
Girshick (1954), Coletti (1990), Holzer (1985), Wakker (1989).
Proof. If f ∼ x, set V (f)=x. V is well deﬁned, in fact the fair price is unique.
Assume the contrary: there exist f ∈ B and x>y∈ R such that f ∼ x and
f ∼ y, hence y < x,b u ty<x , a trivial Dutch book. Clearly, V represents <,i n
particular V is monotonic.110 6.2. Generalized Dutch books and coherence
Assume < allows no aﬃne Dutch books. Next we show that V (φ + β)=V (φ)+β
for all φ ∈ B0 and all β ∈ R.L e tV (φ + β)=d, V (φ)=x and, by contradiction
d>x+β. Then φ+β,x,φ,a n dd are aﬃnely related. It implies that φ+β < d,
x < φ,b u tφ + x + β<d+ φ:a na ﬃne Dutch book. As wanted.
I nt h es a m em a n n e r :V (nφ)=nV (φ) for all φ ∈ B0 and all n ∈ N.A s s u m e
V (nφ)=d, V (φ)=x and d>n x .Then nφ,x,φ,a n dd are aﬃnely related.
Thus nφ < d, x < φ, but nφ + nx < nφ + d:a n a ﬃne Dutch book. Hence,
V (qφ)=qV (φ) for all φ ∈ B0 and all q ∈ Q.
Let φn,φ∈ B0 and assume φn → φ uniformly, there exists {dn} ⊆ R+ such that
dn → 0 and φ − dn ≤ φn ≤ φ + dn,h e n c e
V (φ) − dn = V (φ − dn) ≤ V (φn) ≤ V (φ + dn) ≤ V (φ)+dn
therefore V (φn) → V (φ).T h u sV is supnorm continuous in B0.
Let α>0, φ ∈ B0 and {dn} ⊆ Q+ such that dn → α. Hence dnφ → αφ uniformly,
so V (αφ) = limn V (dnφ)=l i m n dnV (φ)=αV (φ).I ns u m ,V is constant-linear
and supnorm continuous on B0. Again by uniform continuity, it easy to show
that V is constant-linear and continuous on the whole B.
Next we show that a preference represented by a constant linear prevision al-





















































j (s), for all states s,a n dV , being monotonic and constant














,w h i c h
is absurd. Which proves (i).
Assume < allows no comonotonic Dutch books. Next we show that V (φ + ψ)=
V (φ)+V (ψ) for all comonotonic φ,ψ ∈ B0.L e tφ + ψ ∼ d, φ ∼ x and ψ ∼ y
and d>x+y. Then φ+ψ,x,y,d,φ,ψ are comonotonic φ+ψ < d, x < φ, y < ψ,
but φ + ψ + x + y<d+ φ + ψ: a Comonotonic Dutch book. By Schmeidler
(1986) there exists a capacity C such that V|B0(φ)=
R
(φ)dC for all φ ∈ B0. V
and
R
(−)dC are both monotonic and constant linear, hence continuous in B,a n d6. Coherence without Additivity 111
they coincide on B0 which is dense in B,t h e nV =
R
(−)dC. Which proves (ii),
since the same argument we used to exclude aﬃne Dutch books for preferences
represented by a constant linear prevision now permits to exclude comonotonic
Dutch books for preferences represented by a Choquet integral. Clearly, the well
known (iii) can be obtained in a similar way.
Next we consider the consequences of uncertainty aversion on constant-linear
previsions.
Corollary 6.3 Let < be a relation on B represented by a constant linear previ-
sion V : B → R.T h er e l a t i o n< is uncertainty averse iﬀ there exists a compact




Notice that, in the special case in which V (f)=
R
(f)dC this simply means
that < is uncertainty averse iﬀ C is a convex capacity. While the case in which
V (f)=
R
(f)dP is characterized by uncertainty neutrality.
Proof. Similar to Lemma 3.3 in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Available upon
request.
6.3 Conclusions
The Dutch book argument is a now classical coherence condition for the existence
of subjective probabilities. In this note we investigate the possibility of using
this type of argument to shed more light on some successful nonexpected utility
models. The result is formally unifying and is still suggestive, even if it may lack
some normative contents (which, however faces some criticism also in the original
formulation, see e.g. Schick, 1986). On the other hand, it is consistent with a
descriptive approach. As a matter of fact, it is possible to construct examples
showing that Dutch books can pop up in real life situations.112 References
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Deriving Harsanyi’s
Utilitarianism from de Finetti’s
Book Making
7.1 Introduction
This note presents a coherence condition for welfare evaluations. It is based on
the book making argument introduced by de Finetti (1931), a famous argument
in decision under uncertainty. The argument states a natural condition that
turns out to imply the existence of coherent subjective probabilities and justiﬁes
a model of choice based on them. This note shows that de Finetti’s book making
argument also has relevant applications in welfare, where it provides a foundation
for utilitarianism alternative to Harsanyi’s (1955). The debate on Harsanyi’s
utilitarianism is still going on, see for example Weymark (1991, 1993, 1995).
0The results in this chapter were ﬁrst formulated in Diecidue, Enrico (2000), “Deriv-
ing Harsanyi’s Utilitarianism from de Finetti’s Book Making.” CentER, Tilburg University,
Tilburg, The Netherlands.
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7.2 The book making argument
This section presents the book making argument as a welfare translation of the
standard argument. Many contributions to the (standard) book making argument
and its applications are available in the literature, see for example Bunn (1984),
Cubitt and Sugden (1999), Machina (1989), and Yaari (1985). It is remarkable
to see how natural the step from uncertainty to welfare can be made (for more
details, see Broome 1991).
Assume a ﬁnite population S = {s1,...,sn}. An allocation is a welfare distrib-
ution over the population. Allocations are denoted by f, g, h. They can have
diﬀerent kinds of consequences: ﬁnancial, sociological, environmental, health or
security oriented and others. In this note the analysis is restricted to ﬁnancial
consequences, that is, consequences are expressed in terms of money or can be
replaced by monetary equivalents. Formally, the set of real numbers IR is the set
of consequences and an allocation f is a function from the set of people {s1,...,sn}
to the set of consequences. An allocation describes the monetary consequence for
each agent when it is implemented, with f (si),( i =1 ,...,n) the amount of money
for the person si if allocation f is implemented. Allocations are often identiﬁed
with n-tuples and, hence, the set of allocations is identiﬁed with IR n.
A decision maker (in this environment a government or a social planner) has
a preference relation < over the allocations, with Â (strict preference) and ∼
(equivalence) as usual. We assume that < is a weak order: < is complete (for all
allocations f and g, f < g or g < f, or both) and transitive.
Allocations can be combined, i.e., taken together at the same time in the sense
of coordinate-wise addition of the allocations. For example the decision maker
may be a government which combines and implements the decisions taken by the
responsible ministers. In the case of a social planner, he/she combines several
decisions taken in diﬀerent areas.
The novelty of this note is to establish a link between the book making argument
and a welfare framework that permits to justify Harsanyi’s utilitarianism in an
alternative manner. The analysis is formulated for the case of a government as
the decision maker. Similar considerations apply to other cases.
The book making argument is based on the notion of Dutch book. A Dutch book7. Deriving Harsanyi’s Utilitarianism from de Finetti’s Book Making 117
means the following: suppose that there are two arrays of allocations f1,...,fm
and g1,...,gm. Each allocation fj is weakly preferred to gj by the responsible
minister but, taking all the decisions together, i.e., combining all the allocations
at the same time, each person in society is worse oﬀ. The formal deﬁnition follows.
Deﬁnition 7.1 A Dutch book consists of two arrays of allocations f1,...,fm and






gj (si) for all agents si.
Details are as follows. Minister #1 has to choose, for instance, between f1 and
g1. The minister chooses independently from the other minister’s decisions (this
assumption is further discussed in Section 7.3). Suppose f1 < g1:f r o maw e l f a r e
point of view it is weakly preferred, in the opinion of the minister #1, to imple-
ment the allocation f1 rather than g1. Assume that similar preferences hold for
the m ministers: fj < gj for all j =1 ,...,m. It is interesting to analyze what
happens to the agents of the society when the government implements all the m
allocations fj. To analyze the personal situation for any single agent, consider
the monetary situation for a representative agent si. The sum of all the monetary
consequences for si,w h e na l lt h em allocations are implemented, is: f1
si+...+fm
si .
A similar sum is considered for any agent si:
m P
j=1







gj (si) for all agents si, which is troublesome.
Now the book making argument comes. Coherence considerations will drive the
idea that if all the m allocations fj are weakly preferred to the gjs, then one
expects that when the government implements all the allocations at the same
time the population should not be worse oﬀ. But this is not the case when there
is a Dutch book. The book making argument (also named coherence condition)
for social welfare is thus ready: a Dutch book should not exist. The argument
is considered a coherence requirement for rational behavior in collective choices
by many. It is also considered a natural rationality requirement in games theory
and ﬁnance, see Nau and McCardle (1990) and Varian (1987), respectively.
To get the main result of this note another concept is needed: the constant equiv-
alent. A constant equivalent for an allocation f is a consequence c equivalent to118 7.2. The book making argument
the allocation. It is a constant sum of money that, when given to all the n agents,
will lead to an equivalent social welfare improvement as the allocation itself. The
next theorem is the Dutch book theorem for social welfare. It applies Theorem 2
in Diecidue and Wakker (2000) to welfare and it formally states implications of
the book making argument.
Theorem 7.2 The following two statements are equivalent for < on IR n.
(i) There exist unique nonnegative weights p1,...,pn s u m m i n gt oo n es u c ht h a t
preferences maximize f 7→ p1f (s1)+... + pnf (sn).
(ii) The binary relation < is a weak order, for each allocation there exists a
constant equivalent, and no Dutch book can be made.
¤
The theorem presents a condition for the existence and the uniqueness of non-
negative weights pj such that the preferences maximize the weighted sum of the
agents’ consequences. It allows to deﬁne social preference over allocations as a
weighted sum of the consequences for all agents. The present theorem is not new
from a mathematical point of view. The proof is based on Theorem 2 in Diecidue
and Wakker (2000) with a few modiﬁcations to adapt it to a welfare framework.
In terms of welfare, the theorem presents a foundation for utilitarianism that
is alternative to Harsanyi’s. In the present note utilitarianism is actually based
on natural assumptions such as weak ordering, the constant equivalent, and no
Dutch book being allowed. Both approaches assume linear utility, Harsanyi’s with
respect to probability mixtures which requires an expected utility assumption,
and the present approach with respect to monetary consequences. Although
from an economic point of view it can be a limit in the domain of applications, it
is well accepted that when the amount of money under consideration is moderate
then linearity is reasonable (Rabin 2000). Moderate amounts occur in everyday
decisions. For a discussion of linear utility in utilitarianism see Neuefeind &
Trockel (1995).
Another alternative approach to Harsanyi’s theorem is based on Turunen-Red
& Woodland (1999). They present Harsanyi’s theorem as a no arbitrage condi-
tion building on Kuhn-Fourier theorem (1826, 1956). They claim that “linear7. Deriving Harsanyi’s Utilitarianism from de Finetti’s Book Making 119
aggregation is intimately related to an expression of economic rationality, i.e.,
infeasibility of arbitrage outcomes.”
A great deal of literature focuses on the speciﬁcation of the weights pj,i np a r t i c -
ular in welfare and health domains where equity issues are relevant (Ebert 2000,
Wagstaﬀ 1991). As future research it would be interesting to investigate the na-
ture of the pjs and to extend the present analysis to ambiguous or numerically
indeterminate weights, in the spirit of Cohen et al. (2000), Levi (2000), and Nau
and McCardle (1990).
7.3 Examples and Discussion
Two particular examples of social choice are now discussed. They are useful
for clarifying an important assumption underlying the book making argument.
Consequences are expressed in dollars. In the following, allocation and policy are
used interchangeably.
Example 7.3 Suppose that three ministers choose with respect to equity consid-
erations. Minister 1 decides (1,1,1) < (4,0,0), minister 2 decides (1,1,1) <
(0,4,0), and minister 3 decides (1,1,1) < (0,0,4).T a k i n ga l lt h ed e c i s i o n st o -
gether: (3,3,3) is chosen instead of (4,4,4).AD u t c hb o o kh a sr e s u l t e d .
Example 7.4 Suppose that three ministers follow the Rawlsian maximin princi-
ple. Minister 1 decides (1,1,1) < (0,3,3), minister 2 decides (1,1,1) < (3,0,3),
and minister 3 decides (1,1,1) < (3,3,0). Implementing all the policies yields:
(3,3,3) instead of (6,6,6).AD u t c hb o o kh a sr e s u l t e d .
The assumption underlying the book making argument is the following. Consider
two ministers. The choice for the minister #1 is between the two policies f and g.
Suppose that implementing the policy f is weakly preferred to g. Suppose next
that the minister #2 wants to implement the policy h. Thus the whole decision
situation is between the two policies f + h on one hand, and the policy g + h
on the other hand. Policy independence prescribes that minister #1 can consider
t h ec h o i c eb e t w e e nf and g independently of whether the other minister does h.
A formal statement of the previous property is given next.120 7.3. Examples and Discussion
Deﬁnition 7.5 Policy independence: if f < g,t h e nf +h < g+h for all policies
f, g, h.
Policy independence is one of the many additivity or independence-type axioms.
They are considered “key to the practice of understanding problems by decom-
posing them into smaller units” (Anand 1993, p.75). Nevertheless they are con-
sidered somehow controversial in classic expected utility theory: “their meanings,
and plausibility, diﬀer considerably” (Anand 1993, p.75). The claim is that in
welfare economics policy independence has nice interpretations as the following
argumentation shows.
Policy independence is a pragmatic requirement and a everyday practice (see for
instance Gilboa & Schmeidler (1996) and their Axiom 3). For example, in the do-
main of choices involving a government as a decision maker, policy independence
can be justiﬁed as a real incentive scheme to increase motivations and achieve-
ments of the responsible minister. Furthermore, in principal-agent models policy
independence can be considered as a self-control mechanism.
Motivations for policy independence are also found in Read, Loewenstein, and
Rabin (1999). They present the concept of Choice Bracketing stating that when
facing many choices a decision maker can “broadly bracket them by assessing the
consequences of all of them together, or narrowly bracket them by making each
choice in isolation” (p. 171). Cognitive capacity limitations, cognitive inertia,
pre-existing heuristic, motivated bracketing are the justiﬁcations for the narrow
bracket, a concept similar to policy independence. Motivated bracketing can
be explained by mental budgeting: “Budgeting involves earmarking money for
speciﬁc categories of expense...The money so earmarked is spent on that category
of expense, and on nothing else” (p.185). In such a manner the decision maker
can simplify complex problems and turn them into relatively simple decisions. In
the same spirit there is the “salami tactics”: “in which a big problem is sliced up
like a salami and dealt with one slice at a time” (p.192).
In addition, Camerer (1998) describes ten anomalies for expected utility that
are solved by prospect theory. He claims that “isolating or narrowly bracketing
the relevant decisions” is at the basis of prospect theory as an explanation of
phenomena otherwise not solved by expected utility.7. Deriving Harsanyi’s Utilitarianism from de Finetti’s Book Making 121
Policy independence is at the basis of the book making argument for welfare.
It seems for example quite natural to suppose that decisions taken at a local
level are evaluated independently without considering other local decisions. For
instance the preference f < g s h o u l dn o tb ea ﬀected by the decision of h,t h u s
keeping the preference invariant: f +h < g+h. A pragmatic requirement is that
once decisions are aggregated at the national level the society as a whole should
not be harmed: thus no Dutch book.
It is interesting to note that if policy independence holds, then equity issues and
the Rawlsian criterion cannot be taken into account. Policy independence also
has similarities with Strotz’s two stage budgeting in consumer theory (1957). It
states that when deciding about consumption, the decision maker decides ﬁrst
about group expenditures, and then spends the allocated funds within groups. In
this welfare environment the story is similar: ﬁrst the money is allocated to the
diﬀerent ministers. Then the responsible minister takes his own decision inde-
pendently from the others. The diﬀerence is that while Strotz’s argument refers
to diﬀerent commodities, the book making argument is made for one commodity
only and aggregation is made with respect to the diﬀerent decisions.
The previous examples are also relevant from a prescriptive point of view. From
their analysis a simple policy implication can be made for equity considerations:
policies should be considered and evaluated at an aggregated level. Non inte-
grated equity considerations can harm society.
7.4 Conclusion
This note presents a coherence argument for welfare entailing that a Dutch book
should not exist. The present condition builds on the book making argument by
de Finetti (1931). De Finetti’s condition, although not unanimously considered
a rationality requirement, is nowadays a standard argument in the theory of
subjective probabilities, with its own esthetic value based on its pragmatism.
It sounds attractive to have a similar argument for welfare. The appeal of this
translation is given by the simple economic intuition underlying the book making
argument for welfare. To aggregate preferences in a linear manner, the following
is requested: a weak order, the constant equivalent, and no Dutch book allowed.
This last assumption has a natural taste in welfare economics. No Dutch book122 7.4. Conclusion
allowed means that when the allocations fj weakly preferred to the gjsa r et a k e n
together at the same time, the fjs as a whole do not make the population worse
oﬀ.
It is remarkable that Harsanyi’s famous defense of utilitarianism and de Finetti’s
famous book making argument are such close relatives, both being based on linear
utility.7. Deriving Harsanyi’s Utilitarianism from de Finetti’s Book Making 123
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Samenvatting
Dit proefschrift gaat over individuele besluitvorming, voornamelijk wanneer er
sprake is van risico en onzekerheid. Dit betekent dat een besluitvormer (een indi-
vidu, een groep, een overheid) moet kiezen tussen handelingen die mogelijk risi-
covolle of onzekere uitkomsten met zich meebrengen. De besluitvormer heeft een
preferentie-ordening met betrekking tot de handelingen die tot haar mogelijkhe-
den behoren. Waar de kansen bekend zijn wordt gesproken van een keuze onder
risico, terwijl bij het bij keuze onder onzekerheid gaat om onbekende kansen.
Men kan bijvoorbeeld wedden op de uitkomst van een toss, waarbij een geldprijs
wordt uitgekeerd bij kop en niets bij munt. De kansen dat het kop of munt wordt
zijn ieder gelijk aan een half (en zijn bekend). Evenzo kan een speelster geld
inzetten op een paard bij de paardenraces. Slechts één paard zal winnen. Echter,
het is onzeker welk paard dat zal zijn. Afhankelijk van welk paard wint zal zij
een geldprijs uitgekeerd krijgen of niet.
In economie zijn de volgende situaties standaard: verzekeringscontracten, de
v r a a gn a a ra c t i v ai nﬁnanciering, Bayseaanse spelen, gokgedrag, inkomensverdelin-
gen in sociale welvaartstheorie, macro-economische politiek, spaargedrag en pen-
sioenfondsen. Allen zijn sterk beïnvloed door de aanwezigheid van risico of onzek-
erheid. Maar ook een onderneming die besluit om een nieuwe fabriek op te zetten
in een ontwikkelingsland wordt geconfronteerd met een onzeker politiek klimaat.
De onzekerheid over de verkiezingsuitslagen in de V.S. beïnvloedt wereldwijd de
investeringen.
De doelstelling van dit proefschrift is daarom de bestudering van het individuele
keuzegedrag, zowel vanuit een normatief als een beschrijvend oogpunt. Klassieke
modellen zijn het expected utility model (von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944) en
het subjective expected utility model (Savage 1954).
De beschrijvende capaciteit van bovengenoemde modellen is betwist doordat het
gevonden gedrag niet in overeenstemming i sm e td et h e o r e t i s c h ev o o r s p e l l i n g e n ,
zoals aangetoond door bijvoorbeeld Allais (1953) en Ellsberg (1961). Sinds eind
jaren ’70 zijn verschillende alternatieven voor het klassieke paradigma aange-
dragen om aan deze tekortkomingen tege m o e tt ek o m e n ,z i eS c h m i d t( 1 9 9 8 )e n
Starmer (2000) voor overzichten.126 Samenvatting
In dit proefschrift ligt de nadruk op het bestuderen van modellen die een al-
ternatief vormen voor het klassieke paradigma. Starmer (2000) stelt dat ”an
enormous amount of theoretical eﬀort has been devoted towards developing al-
ternatives to expected utility (...).” Onder de vele bestaande alternatieven ligt
de nadruk in de literatuur op rang-afhankelijke modellen. De rang-afhankelijke
modellen werden geïntroduceerd door Quiggin (1981) met betrekking tot keuze
onder risico (bekende kansen) en door Schmeidler (1989) voor keuze onder onzek-
erheid (onbekende kansen). Zij veralgemeniseren en stellen een uitbreiding voor
van het klassieke paradigma door het toelaten van het niet-lineair wegen van
kansen. In deze theorieën spelen de beslissingsgewichten (een transformatie van
kansen door middel van een wegingsfuntie) een belangrijke rol bij het verklaren
van fenomenen die niet gevat worden door het klassieke expected utility. Besliss-
ingsgewichten karakteriseren de gevoeligheid ten aanzien van kansen, een concept
dat aan populariteit wint in de economische theorie, zie bijvoorbeeld Camerer
(1999). Daarnaast is rang-afhankelijkheid ingepast in de originele prospect the-
ory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979), hetgeen heeft geleid tot cumulative prospect
theory (Tversky & Kahneman 1992).
Het huidige proefschrift bestaat uit zes hoofdstukken. In het eerste deel van het
proefschrift worden twee aannemelijke alternatieven voor expected utility en een
experimenteel onderzoek over rang-afhankelijkheid uiteengezet. In hoofdstuk 2
wordt een intuïtie gegeven die ten grondslag ligt aan de rang-afhankelijke mod-
ellen. Een model zou aan drie vereisten moeten voldoen. Het zou wiskundig
gedegen moeten zijn om anomalieën in gedrag, zoals ongeloofwaardige schend-
ing van stochastische dominantie, te voorkomen (Fishburn 1978). Deze vereiste
kan gegarandeerd worden door een van de vele axiomatiseringen van preferenties.
Een model moet zich accommoderen aan geobserveerd gedrag: de empirische
verklaringskracht van rang-afhankelijke modellen is bestudeerd en deze studie
is nog steeds aan de gang. Bovendien moet een model intuïtief aannemelijk
zijn. De gebruikte concepten moeten nieuwe inzichten verschaﬀen en economisch
betekenisvol zijn. Slechts een paar auteurs hebben intuïtieve principes aangedra-
gen voor de bouwstenen van rang-afhankelijke modellen: rang-afhankelijkheid en
comonoticiteit. Recentelijk is gesuggereerd dat dit technische concepten zijn zon-
der intuïtie of empirische inhoud en dat het aan een complete intuïtieve basis
voor rang-afhankelijkheid nog steeds ontbreekt. Deze studie introduceert zo’n
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afhankelijkheid en comoniticiteit meer aannemelijke begrippen op basis waarvan
prefentie condities, empirische toetsen en verbeteringen voor het meten van nut
kunnen worden gebaseerd. Voorts is een nieuwe aﬂeiding van rang-afhankelijke
modellen verkregen. Deze is niet gebaseerd op waarneembare preferenties, maar
volgt vanzelf uit het veronderstelde perspectief. Wij denken dat de populariteit
van rang-afhankelijke theorieën vooral een gevolg is van de aannemelijke con-
cepten die gebruikt worden in deze theorie.
Vervolgens wordt een tweede alternatief uiteengezet. De hoofdzaak van hoofd-
stuk 3 is een model uiteen te zetten dat expected utility veralgemeniseert door
een verschillende behandeling van risicoloze uitkomsten toe te laten, waarbij de
karakteristieken van expected utility worden behouden bij risicovolle uitkom-
sten. Dit wordt bereikt door een verzwakking van het onafhankelijkheidsax-
ioma. Het is intuïtief aannemelijk dat risicoloze en risicovolle verwachtingen
anders benaderd worden. Hoofdstuk 3 zet dan ook een algemeen model uiteen
voor het gambling eﬀect, met andere woorden het eﬀect dat ricicovolle spelen
anders geëvalueerd worden dan risicoloze uitkomsten doordat wedden een in-
trinsieke waarde heeft (positief danwel negatief). Er is al meer dan een eeuw
gezinspeeld op een dergelijk model. Echter, theoretische modellen zijn praktisch
afwezig, waarschijnlijk door het holistische karakter van het gambling eﬀect en
de strijdigheid met stochastische dominantie die het tot gevolg heeft. Slechts
recentelijk hebben keuze-theoretici een interesse ontwikkeld voor dergelijke ele-
mentaire schendingen van rationaliteitscondities, zoals stochastische dominantie.
Het bestudeerde model biedt een traceerbare theoretische basis voor het gambling
eﬀect. Het accommodeert aan de Allais paradox terwijl het slechts minimaal
afwijkt van expected utility en het werpt nieuw licht op risico-aversie en het on-
derscheid tussen von Neumann-Morgenstern nut en neo-klassiek (risicoloos) nut.
De bovengenoemde schendingen van stochastische dominantie benadrukken het
beschrijvende karakter van het hoofdstuk.
Het ontwerp en de resultaten van een experiment over rang-afhankelijkheid wor-
den uiteengezet in hoofdstuk 4. Dit hoofdstuk onderzoekt de empirische verk-
laringskracht van rang-afhankelijk nut en prospect theory voor spelen met drie
uitkomsten. We vinden enig bewijs voor rang-afhankelijkheid, maar er zijn
veel verstorende factoren die een sterker eﬀect hebben. De gevonden rang-
afhankelijkheid suggereert een rijk patroon aan verschijnselen, waaronder op-
timisme, pessimisme, en omgekeerde-S functies. Onze deelnemers zijn meer risi-128 Samenvatting
cozoekend dan voorspeld door de huidige theorieën.
Het tweede deel van het proefschrift is gewijd aan de bestudering, uitbreiding en
toepassingen van het book-making principe van de Finetti (1931). Het principe
is ook bekend als het Dutch book principe of het coherentie principe en het stelt
de voldoende en noodzakelijke voorwaarden voor het bestaan van subjectieve
kansen en de uniekheid ervan. Het principe staat aan de basis van de theorie van
subjectieve kansen en is een fundamenteel instrument in keuze-theorie: het heeft
Savage’s werk aanzienlijk beïnvloed. Vier bijdragen worden in dit proefschrift
uiteengezet.
Hoofdstuk 5 formaliseert de Finetti’s book-making principe als een statisch in-
dividuele preferentie conditie. Dit voorkomt de verstorende strategische en dy-
namische eﬀecten van moderne formuleringen waarin het gebruikelijk is om spe-
len te beschouwen waarbij de handelingen van degenen die een weddenschap
aangaan sequentieel plaatsvinden. Vervolgens wordt aangetoond hoe het book-
making principe, dat doorgaans gebruikt wordt om additieve subjectieve kansen
te rechtvaardigen, aangepast kan worden om in overeenstemming te komen met
enkele nonexpected utility modellen die niet-additieve kansen gebruiken. Meer
nauwkeurig wordt een nieuwe basis voor rang-afhankelijke modellen uiteengezet
die gebaseerd is op een comonotonische uitbreiding van het book-making principe.
Deze uitbreiding sluit book-making alleen uit wanneer alle beschouwde spelen tot
dezelfde rangorde leiden van mogelijke toestanden op basis van de gunstigheid van
de daarbij behorende uitkomsten. Typische eigenschappen van rang-afhankelijke
modellen, zoals hedging, aversie tegen ambiguïteit en pessimisme en optimisme,
kunnen worden verklaard. Suggesties worden gegeven voor een empirische meting
van niet-additieve kansen. Deze bijdrage kan uit verschillende oogpunten worden
bezien. Het resultaat is niet alleen een niet-additieve uitbreiding van de Finetti’s
book-making principe, maar is ook de keerzijde van Yaari (1987) voor onzeker-
heid. Daarnaast kan dit resultaat geïnterpreteerd worden als gaande terug op
Preston and Baratta (1948), een van de eerste werken in empirische psychologie
dat het gedrag van mensen onder onzekerheid probeert te verklaren door middel
van een transformatie van kansen in plaats van door middel van een transfor-
matie van uitkomsten. Het theoretisch kader voor een niet-additieve versie van
het book-making principe wordt getest in hoofdstuk 4.
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erk voor het book-making principe in een situatie met niet-additieve kansen.
Waar hoofdstuk 5 zich voornamelijk richt op de strijdigheid van het gevonden
gedrag met het klassieke principe van de Finetti zonder naar een maximale
wiskundige algemeenheid te zoeken, is het doel van hoofdstuk 6 om het book-
making principe van de Finetti uiteen te zetten in een meer algemeen raamwerk.
Het resultaat toont aan dat het mogelijk is om een nieuwe verenigende basis te
leggen voor verschillende niet-additieve modellen gebaseerd op de Finetti’s book-
making principe. Speciﬁeke gevallen worden verkregen door comonoticiteit en
aﬃne gerelateerde Dutch books die leiden tot Choquet verwachtingen en Min
verwachtingen.
Als een economische toepassing van het book-making principe wordt een wel-
vaartsanalyse en een sociale keuze analyse uitgevoerd in hoofdstuk 7. Het doel is
om een coherentie conditie te poneren voor inkomensallocaties over een populatie
in de geest van het book-making principe. De vorige hoofdstukken hebben laten
zien dat dit principe bekend en geaccepteerd is in de kanstheorie en uitgebreid
bestudeerd is in de wiskundige literatuur en in de keuze-theorie, waar het kan wor-
den uitgebreid naar verschillende niet-additieve modellen. Het is ook interessant
om de implicaties hiervan te analyseren op het gebied van welvaarsteconomie. De
structuur van het argument is gelijk aan het origineel met een licht afwijkende ter-
minologie. Individuen zijn gesubstitueerd voor mogelijke toestanden, gewichten
toegekend aan individuen voor kansen en allocaties voor weddenschappen. Allo-
caties beschrijven de monetaire uitbetaling voor ieder individu wanneer een beleid
is geïmplementeerd door de overheid. Het resultaat toont aan dat om preferenties
over allocaties lineair te aggregeren het volgende vereist is: een zwakke ordening,
een constante-equivalent en uitsluiting van een Dutch-book. Het nieuwe principe
draagt daarom een nieuwe basis aan voor utilitarisme dat een alternatief vormt
voor dat van Harsanyi. Aantrekkelijk in dit principe voor welvaartseconomie is
dat het gebaseerd is op natuurlijke en intuïtieve principes.